

## Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

Units 1 to 3: shutdown due to the earthquake

(Units 4 to 6: Outage due to regular inspections)

- The national government has declared the area within 20km radius of the site as a “no-go zone” and between 20km and 30km radius of the site as a “stay-indoors zone.”
- Off-site power has been connected to Units 1 to 6 by March 22, 2011.
- At approximately 6:38am, April 12, fire has been found at the distribution switchboard containing batteries located in the sampling equipment switchbox situated close to the south water discharge channel for Units 1 to 4. The self defense fire fighting team conducted the fire fighting at an early stage. At the same time, at approximately 6:45am, we reported to the Futaba fire authorities. There is no impact on the external release of radioactive substances or on the cooling capability of the reactor by this incident. There has been no change on the monitoring figures of the surrounding environment. The Futaba fire authorities confirmed fire extinguishment on site survey at 9:12am, April 12.
- At approximately 8:00 am on May 31, we confirmed oil leakage to the sea around the curtain wall of the water intake canal of Unit 5 & 6 and reported the issue to Futaba Wide-area Fire Headquarters and Fukushima Coastguard Office. As a result of our investigation, we confirmed that oil leaked from pipes around seawall to the port through holes of steel sheet piles and that the leakage already stopped. Since the diffused area was just around the curtain wall and the surface of the sea around Shallow Draft Quay and the oil film was very thin, we confirmed that there is no spread to the outer sea. We completed installing oil-absorbing mat around seawall at approximately 2:00 pm and also completed installing oil fences at 4:50 pm. We plan to protect pipes around seawall and collect the oil. At 10:00 am on June 14, we closed the open part at the bottom of curtain wall, through which the oil leaked
- At approximately 2:30 pm on May 31, big sound was confirmed at the southern side of the reactor building of Unit 4, where wireless unmanned heavy machineries

were removing rubbles. We confirmed that the sound was the impact sound when the unmanned heavy machinery tugged and broke some cylinder. Nobody got injured. There was no change in the data of the monitoring post.

- At 2:20 pm on June 8, the main control room lights of unit1/2 went out. At 2:35 pm, a part of power panel suspended. At 2:49 pm, monitoring post (MP7/8) transmission path were suspended. At 2:57 pm, nitrogen supply facilities were halt due to pressure rise.

After that, at 5:32 pm, the power panel was restored. At 5:50 pm, monitoring post (MP7/8) transmission paths were resumed. Also, at 5:54 pm, injection of nitrogen to Unit 1 was resumed. Due to suspension of this power panel, transfer of accumulated water at Unit 2 turbine building vertical shaft to the Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility (Process Main Building) had also been suspended, however at 6:03 pm, transfer was resumed. As a result of an investigation, we presume that the power panel was suspended due to error signal from supply side of an unused facility.

### **[Unit 1]**

- The explosive sound and white smoke was confirmed near Unit 1 when the big quake occurred at 3:36pm, March 12.

<Water injection to the reactor>

- At 7:04 pm, March 12 seawater injection was started. Later boric acid which absorbs neutron was added.
- At approx. 2:30am, March 23: sea water injection through feed water system was started. At 3:37pm, March 25, it was switched to fresh water. At 8:32am, Mar 29, the fire pump used to inject fresh water was replaced by a temporary motor driven pump. From 10:42 am to 11:52am on April 3, the fire pump was temporarily used for the water injection in order to switch the power of the motor driven pump from temporary power to the off-site power. It was again switched to the motor driven pump, and the fresh water injection was continued.
- Water injection to the reactor was temporarily suspended due to partial shutdown

of the off-site power caused by the earthquake which occurred at approximately 5:16pm, April 11. Following the restoration of off-site power, water injection resumed at approximately 6:04pm.

- At 5:00 pm, on April 15, we completed transferring emergency power sources to spray water to the reactor to the upland.
- On April 18, in order to replace hoses, which were used to inject water to the reactor, injecting water was temporarily suspended. After replacement, we restarted injecting water by pumps.
- Before the work to connect high voltage power panels of Unit 1/2 and Unit 5/6 was initiated, the power source of pumps to inject water to reactors was switched to a temporary diesel generator at 10:57 am on April 25. At 6:25pm on April 25, the power source was switched back to the power system.
- In order to identify the appropriate injection amount of water in making the fuels submerged in water, at 10:02 am, April 27, we started the operation to increase the amount of water to the reactor of Unit 1 from approx. 6 m<sup>3</sup>/h. By monitoring the parameters, we injected approximately 10 m<sup>3</sup>/h of freshwater to the reactor. From 10:14 am, April 29, we put the amount of injecting freshwater back to approximately 6m<sup>3</sup>/h into the reactor and continue injecting freshwater.
- At 10:01 am on May 6, in order to submerge nuclear reactor in water, we have increased the amount of injecting freshwater from approximately 6m<sup>3</sup>/h to approximately 8m<sup>3</sup>/h.
- We calibrated water level gauge of the reactor of Unit 1 from May 10 to 11.
- We calibrated pressure gauge of the primary containment vessel of Unit 1 on May 11.
- At 1:28 pm on May 15, we have increased the amount of freshwater injected into the reactor from approximately 8m<sup>3</sup>/h to approximately 10m<sup>3</sup>/h so that we can monitor the trend shift of parameters of the Reactor Pressure Vessel as well as the Primary Containment Vessel, the shift which would be resulted from the increase of the amount of injected freshwater.
- Trend monitoring of how the parameters of reactor pressure vessel and primary

containment vessel varied when water injection to Unit 1 reactor increased, was completed. At 11:50 am on May 17, water injection rate to the reactor was changed from approx. 10m<sup>3</sup>/h to approx. 6m<sup>3</sup>/h.

- Since we finished monitoring trends of parameters, at 8:30 pm on May 31, we changed the rate of water injection to the reactor of Unit 1 from approx. 6m<sup>3</sup>/h to approx. 5m<sup>3</sup>/h.
- We suspended water injection into the reactor of Unit 1 from 9:57 am to 10:02 am and from 1:43 pm to 1:56 pm on June 4 in order to change the route of water supply. At 10:02 am on June 4, we restarted water injection by fire engines. At 1:43 pm on June 4, we stopped the fire engine (suspended water injection). At 1:56 pm, we restarted water injection with an electric pump.
- At 3:35 pm on June 14, water injection was temporarily suspended due to the switch of injection pipeline to Unit 1 reactor. Water injection was resumed at 3:50 pm.
- At 10:06 am on June 15, the amount of injected water to the reactor was changed from approx. 5 m<sup>3</sup>/h to approx. 4.5 m<sup>3</sup>/h.
- At 10:02 am on June 21 we changed the rate of water injection to the reactor from approx. 4.5 m<sup>3</sup>/h to approx. 4.0m<sup>3</sup>/h through reactor feed water system piping arrangement.
- At 10:02 am on June 22, we changed the volume of water injection from feed water system piping arrangement into the reactor of Unit 1, from approx. 4.0m<sup>3</sup>/h to approx. 3.5 m<sup>3</sup>/h.
- At 4:20 pm on June 27, in addition to injecting water from the filter tank, we started to use treated water. At 5:55 pm, we stopped supplying treated water.
- At 11:47 am on June 28, we adjusted injection rate from feed water system piping arrangement to approximately 3.5m<sup>3</sup> since decrease in amount of water injection at the reactor of Unit 1 was confirmed.
- At 2:36 pm on June 28, we started to operate the transfer pumps of water treatment system. After confirming no leakage and adjusting water volume, we started to operate circulating injection cooling at 3:55 pm, June 28.

- At 10:59 am on June 29, we stopped the transfer pumps, and started it at 1:12 pm. At 1:33 pm on June 29, we started to operate circulating injection cooling.
- Since the amount of water injected into the reactor of Unit 1 was decreased at 1:49 pm on June 29, we adjusted water injection at approx. 3.5 m<sup>3</sup>/h through reactor feed water system piping arrangement.

<Water spray to the spent fuel pool>

- The sea water spray was conducted using the concrete pumping vehicle from 1:03pm to 4:04pm, March 31.
- In order to confirm the position of water spray to the spent fuel pool by the concrete pumping vehicle, the sea water spray was conducted from 5:16pm to 5:19pm, April 2.
- From 3:07 pm to 3:18 pm on May 14, we sprayed freshwater into the spent fuel pool of Unit 1 with the concrete pumping vehicle (We broke off due to a strong wind).
- From 3:06 pm to 4:15 pm on May 20, we sprayed freshwater into the spent fuel pool of Unit 1 with the concrete pumping vehicle (We broke off due to a strong wind).
- From 3:22 pm on May 22, we started spraying water into the spent fuel pool of Unit 1 by a concrete pumping vehicle, and finished at 5:09 pm.
- From 4:47 pm to 5:00 pm on May 28, we conducted the leak test for Unit 1 spent fuel pool by fresh water injection using Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System).
- From 11:10 am on May 29, we started spraying freshwater into the spent fuel pool of Unit 1 through Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System), and finished at 3:35 pm.
- From 10:16 am on June 5, we started spraying freshwater into the spent fuel pool of Unit 1 through Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System), and finished at 10:48 am.

<Draining water from the underground floor of the turbine building>

- At approximately 5:00pm, March 24, draining water from the basement of the turbine building into a condenser was started. It was paused at approx. 7:30am, March 29 because it reached almost full capacity. In order to move the water in the condenser to a condensate storage tank, water in the condensate storage tank was transferred to suppression pool's water surge-tank from around 12:00pm, March 31 to 3:26pm, April 2.
- The water transfer from the condenser to the condensate storage tank was started at 1:55pm, April 3. It was completed at 9:30am, April 10.
- From 2:58 pm to 5:43 pm on June 13, we transferred accumulated water from the condenser to the Turbine Building.
- At 10:33 on June 15, transfer of accumulated water in the Unit 1 condenser to condenser storage tank was initiated. We stopped transferring at 9:52am on June 16.

<Injection of nitrogen to the reactor containment vessel>

- As it is suspected that hydrogen gas may be accumulated inside the reactor containment vessel, at 10:30pm, April 6, we started the operation of the valve for the injection of nitrogen to the vessel in order to prevent the increase of oxygen density. Then, nitrogen injection to the vessel was started at 1:31am, April 7.
- Injection of nitrogen to the vessel was suspended due to the earthquake which occurred at approximately 5:16pm, April 11, and resumed at 11:34pm on the same day.
- Regarding the work to connect high voltage power panels of Unit 1/2 and Unit 5/6, that of Unit1/2 became temporarily offline and a pump to inject nitrogen was stopped from 2:10 pm on April 25. At 7:10pm on the same day, we restarted the pump.
- The pump to inject nitrogen to Unit 1 was stopped from 8:51 am on May 11 since part of power source of Unit 1 & 2 had been switched to Okuma Line No.2. Restarted at 3:58 pm, on May 11.

- At approx. 2:00 pm, May 21, nitrogen injection to the vessel was stopped (The compressor stopped due to “High temperature”.) On the same day, the back-up supply facility was started up (approx. 20m<sup>3</sup>/h) at 5:00pm. The amount of nitrogen was increased to approx. 26 m<sup>3</sup>/h at 8:31pm. At 10:56 am, on May 22 we stopped the back-up supply facility. At 11:23 am, on May 22, we started the nitrogen gas injection pump for Units 2 and 3 (increased to approx 28 m<sup>3</sup>/h).
- Due to the change of onsite power source structure after the restoration of Okuma No. 2 line, power source to electromagnetic valve in nitrogen injection line was switched. In order to switch to the temporal power source, nitrogen injection was temporarily suspended at 9:14 am May 25 and was resumed at 9:18 am May 25. When we suspended nitrogen injection from 3:16pm to 3:18pm on May 25 and checked the operation condition in order to switch to the permanent power source, at 3:45pm, we found that the nitrogen injection compressor was stopped. At 7:44pm on the same day, we started a substitution compressor and injecting nitrogen at about 28m<sup>3</sup>/h.
- At 11:48 am on June 19, we stopped the equipment to supply nitrogen to the primary containment vessel of Unit 1 due to switching the power in the site. At 4:15 pm on the same day, we resumed its operation.
- At 11:55 am on June 21 we temporarily stopped operating the nitrogen supply equipment to Primary Containment Vessel due to work to install a transformer in the Power Station. At 6:03 pm on same day, we recommenced operation of nitrogen supplying facility.
- At 8:51 am on June 27, due to the changeover of power source inside the power station, we temporarily stopped nitrogen gas injection to Primary Containment Vessel.

#### <Improvement of working environment>

- On May 2, we started work to install the local exhausters in order to improve the working environment in the reactor building.
- At 4:36pm on May 5, we started to ventilate with 6 local exhausters the reactor

building of Unit 1 in order to improve the working environment of the building.

- Consequently, we confirmed that radioactivity density inside of the reactor building decreased enough, and opened the double doors (removed the duct of the local exhausters) of the reactor building at 8:08 pm on May 8. After removing sheets used for the installation of the local exhausters, we opened the double doors of the reactor building at 4:17 am on May 9. Then, we confirmed air dose rate as of 5:00 am and evaluated that there was no impact on the surrounding area.

#### <Others>

- Lights in the main control room were turned on at approx. 11:30am, March 24.
- Some of turbine building lights were turned on April 2.
- From 4:00pm to 5:30pm, April 17, the condition (radiation dose, temperature, oxygen density) inside the reactor building of Unit 1 was observed by a remote-controlled robot.
- From 11:35 am to 1:24pm, April 26, the condition inside the reactor building of Unit 1 was observed by a remote-controlled robot and we confirmed that there was neither major change in the radiation dose nor significant water leakage from the Primary Containment Vessel.
- From 11:36 am to 2:05pm, April 29, the condition inside the reactor building of Unit 1 was observed by a remote-controlled robot and we confirmed that there was no significant water leakage from the Primary Containment Vessel.
- From 4:01 pm to 5:39pm, May 13, the condition inside the reactor building of Unit 1 was observed by a remote-controlled robot.
- Preparatory work to cover reactor building was initiated on May 13. On June 28, we started construction work of installing covers over the reactor buildings by moving crawler cranes.
- On May 20, our staffs went into the reactor building of Unit 1 to measure the water level and radiation level by a camera.
- From 12:30 pm to 1:50 pm, on May 22, we sampled, on a trial basis, radioactive

materials in the ambient air at the opening of the Reactor Building, Unit 1. As a result of analysis, Iodine 134, Cesium 134, and Cesium 137 were detected.

- From 10:38 am to 12:21 pm on June 3, installation work of temporary reactor pressure meter at Unit 1 was implemented.
- On June 15, test of decontamination was conducted inside the truck bay door to investigate the measures of decontamination. Result is being analyzed.

## [Unit 2]

- At approx. 6:14am, March 15, the abnormal sound was confirmed near the suppression chamber and the pressure inside the chamber decreased afterwards. It was determined that there was a possibility that something happened in the suppression chamber. While sea water injection to the reactor continued, TEPCO employees and partner companies' workers not in charge of water injection work started tentative evacuation to a safe location. Sea water injection to the reactor continued.
- At approx. 9:24 am, May 18, the first workers went into the reactor building after the occurrence of abnormal sound near the suppression chamber.

### <Water injection to the reactor>

- At 1:25pm, March 14, since the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System failed, it was determined that a specific incident stipulated in Clause 1, Article 15 of Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness occurred (failure of reactor cooling function).
- At 5:17pm, March 14, while the water level in the reactor reached the top of the fuel rod, we resumed the water injection with the valve operation.
- At 10:10am on March 26, freshwater (with boric acid) injection was initiated. (switched from the seawater injection) At 6:31pm, March 27, the fire pump used for the injection was switched to a temporary motor driven pump.
- From 10:22am to 12:06pm on April 3, the fire pump was temporarily used for the water injection in order to switch the power of the motor driven pump from

temporary power to the off-site power. It was again switched to the motor driven pump, and the freshwater injection is continued.

- Water injection to the reactor was temporarily suspended due to partial shutdown of the off-site power caused by the earthquake which occurred at approximately 5:16pm, April 11. Following the restoration of off-site power, water injection resumed at approximately 6:04pm.
- At 5:00 pm, on April 15, we had completed transferring emergency power sources to spray water to the reactor to the upland.
- On April 18, in order to replace hoses, which were used to inject water to the reactors, injecting water was temporarily suspended. After replacement, we restarted injecting water by pumps
- Before the work to connect high voltage power panels of Unit 1/2 and Unit 5/6, the power source of pumps to inject water to reactors was switched to a temporary diesel generator at 10:57 am on April 25. Offsite power was restored at 6:25 pm.
- From 11:33 am on May 29, we started water injection to the reactor of Unit 2 through reactor feed water system at approximately 5m<sup>3</sup>/h. (water injection through fire extinction system was continued at approximately 7m<sup>3</sup>/h.)
- At 12:01 am on May 30, we changed the rate of water injection to the reactor of Unit 2 through the fire extinction system from approximately 7m<sup>3</sup>/h to approximately 2m<sup>3</sup>/h. The rate of water injection was changed to approximately 1 m<sup>3</sup>/h at 10:38 am. At 6:05 pm on the same day, water injection through the fire extinction system was stopped (water injection through feed water system was continued at approximately 5 m<sup>3</sup>/h.)
- At 1:49 pm on June 3, freshwater injection was suspended in Unit 2 due to re-routing of the water supply line to the reactor. At 2:09 pm on June 3, freshwater injection was resumed.
- At 12:14 pm on June 14, water injection was temporarily suspended due to the switch of injection pipeline to Unit 2 reactor. Water injection was resumed at 12:37 pm.
- At 10:04 am on June 22 we changed the rate of water injection to Reactor from

approx. 4.5 m<sup>3</sup>/h to approx. 4.0m<sup>3</sup>/h through reactor feed water system piping arrangement. After that the indicated value of injection flow was fluctuating, however it settled at approximately 3.5m<sup>3</sup>/h now.

- At 6:27 pm on June 23, regarding the water injection line to the reactor of each unit, we changed for Unit 1 and Unit 2 by using electrical reactor water injection pumps for Unit1, and stopped electrical reactor water injection pumps for Unit 2.
- At 4:20 pm on June 27, in addition to injecting water from the filter tank, we started to use treated water. At 5:55 pm, we stopped supplying treated water.
- At 2:36 pm on June 28, we started to operate the transfer pumps of water treatment system. After confirming no leakage and adjusting water volume, we started to operate circulating injection cooling at 3:55 pm, June 28.
- At 10:59 am on June 29, we stopped the transfer pumps, and started it at 1:12 pm. At 1:33 pm on June 29, we started to operate circulating injection cooling.

<Water spray to the spent fuel pool>

[Seawater spray]

- From approx. 3:05pm to approx. 5:20pm on March 20: about 40 tons of sea water injection through Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System) (by TEPCO).
- From approx. 4:07pm to 5:01pm on March 22: about 18 tons of sea water injection through Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System) (by TEPCO).
- From 10:30am to 12:19pm on March 25: sea water injection through Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System).

[Freshwater spray]

- From 4:30pm to 6:25pm on March 29: fresh water injection through Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System) (Switched to fresh water injection).
- At 9:25am, March 30, we started fresh water injection by a temporary motor driven pump, but the pump was switched to a fire pump due to the pump trouble. At 1:10pm, March 30, fresh water injection was suspended, because we found

the crack on a part of the hose. At 7:05pm, March 30th, freshwater injection was resumed and finished at 11:50pm, March 30.

- Freshwater injection through Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System
  - From 2:56pm to 5:05pm on April 1: water injection using the temporary motor driven pump.
  - From 11:05am to 1:37 pm on April 4: water injection using the temporary motor driven pump.
  - From 1:29pm to 2:34pm on April 7: water injection using the temporary motor driven pump.
  - From 10:37am to 12:38pm on April 10: water injection using the temporary motor driven pump.
  - From 1:15pm to 2:55pm on April 13: water injection using the temporary motor driven pump
  - From 10:13am to 11:54am on April 16: water injection using the temporary motor driven pump
  - From 4:08pm to 5:28pm on April 19: water injection using the temporary motor driven pump
  - From 3:55pm to 5:40pm on April 22: water injection using the temporary motor driven pump
  - From 10:12am to 11:18am on April 25: water injection using the temporary motor driven pump
  - From 10:15am to 11:28am on April 28: water injection using the temporary motor driven pump
  - From 10:05am to 11:40am on May 2: water injection using the temporary motor driven pump
  - From 9:36am to 11:16am on May 6: water injection using the temporary motor driven pump
- From 1:09pm to 2:45pm on May 10, water injection through Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System (hydrazine was added for the period from

1:19pm to 2:35pm)

- Freshwater injection through Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System  
From 1:00pm to 2:37 pm on May 14, (hydrazine injection from 1:08pm to 2:02pm)  
From 1:10 pm to 2:40 pm on May 18 (hydrazine injection from 1:15 pm to 2:30 pm)  
From 1:02 pm to 2:40 pm on May 22 (hydrazine injection from 1:04 pm to 2:03 pm)  
From 10:06 am to 11:36 am on May 26 (hydrazine injection from 10:10 am to 11:10 am)  
From 12:06 pm to 1:52 pm on May 30  
From 6:06 am to 6:53 pm, on June 1

#### < Nuclide analysis of spent fuel pool water >

- On April 16, in order to check the condition of the water in the spent fuel pool for the purpose of designing temporary cooling equipment that we are planning to install in the pool, we collected and conducted a nuclide analysis of approximately 400 ml of water that flowed out of the pool into the skimmer surge tanks\*, and as a result iodine-131, cesium-134, and cesium-137 were detected. Later we conducted detailed analysis, and on May 31 we concluded that the large portion of spent fuel was sound.  
\* skimmer surge tanks: 2 tanks installed between the spent fuel pool and the nuclear reactor well to store the water that overflows from the pool and the well.

#### < Cooling of spent fuel pool by alternative system >

- On May 24, a heat exchanger installation work was conducted.
- On May 25, a pipe connecting work was conducted.
- At 11:15 am on May 30, we conducted the leakage test of the secondary system of the alternative cooling system for the spent fuel pool, and started to make a trial

run of the secondary system at 3:02 pm.

- At 11:40 am on May 31, we conducted leakage test on the primary system of the alternative cooling system of the spent fuel pool. At 5:21 pm on the same day, we started the operation. At 6:11 pm we reached to the rate flow (approx. 100m<sup>3</sup>/h). Later at 1:47 am on June 1, we adjusted the flow rate to 80m<sup>3</sup>/h.  
At 5:06 am on June 1, we stopped primary pumps. From 6:06 am to 6:53 am, we injected freshwater through Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System. At 7:06 am, we restarted primary pumps.  
At 11:03 am on June 19, we stopped the operation of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System) of Unit 2 due to switching the power in the plant. At 4:00 pm on the same day we resumed its operation.
- At 8:23 am on June 27, due to the changeover of power source inside the power station, we temporarily stopped Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Purification System.

#### < Draining water from the underground floor of the turbine building >

- In order to drain the accumulated water in the basement of the turbine building to a condenser, at approx. 4:45pm, March 29, the water in a condensate storage tank was started to be transferred to suppression pool's water surge-tanks as a preparatory work for the water transfer from a condenser to a condensate storage tank. At 11:50am, April 1, transfer was completed.
- The water transfer from the condenser to the condensate storage tank was started at 5:10pm, April 2. It was finished at 1:10pm, April 9th.
- The water transfer from the trench to Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility (Process Main Building) was started at 10:08 am, April 19.
- In order to check the transfer facility and bolster the supervising function, we temporarily suspended transfer at 9:16 am, April 29. We resumed transfer at 2:05 pm, April 30.
- In order to allow work for switching the water injection line for Reactor, Unit 3 to the reactor feed water system, we temporarily suspended transfer at 9:22 am, May 7. We resumed at 4:02 pm. Similarly, we suspended at 9:01 am, May 10 and

resumed at 3:20 pm, May 12.

- We altered the configuration of power source inside the power station after restoration of Okuma line, #2. To do so, we stopped the temporary power board. In connection with that, we temporarily suspended transfer from 9:05 am to 3:30 pm on May 25. Given the volume of water accumulated at Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility, we suspended transfer at 4:01 pm on May 26.
- At 2:45 pm on May 26, we started to empty water in the condenser, T/B in order to be prepared for the construction for water injection through feed water system piping arrangement into the reactor of Unit 2. Completed at 2:30 pm on May 27.
- At 6:39 pm on June 3, we started transferring the accumulated water in the trench of the turbine building of Unit 2 to the condenser hot well in the turbine building. The transfer completed at 0:28 pm on June 4.
- As the accumulated water in T/B of Units 2 and 3 was increasing, in order to avoid leakage to outside, we reconsidered the allowable water level at Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility (Process Main Building). We reported the result to Minister of METI, had it reviewed by NISA, then started transfer of accumulated water in the pit, T/B, Unit 2 to Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility (Process Main Building).
- At 2:20 pm on June 8, we temporarily suspended transfer due to stoppage of electricity supply for the pump. We resumed transfer at 6:03 pm, June 8. We stopped transfer at 8:40 am, June 16.
- At 2:20 pm on June 17, we started a water transfer from the vertical shaft of the turbine building of Unit 2 to the surface condenser hot well of Unit 1. We confirmed that the water did not flow at the entrance of pump and interrupted the work at 2:59 pm on the same day. Now we are investigating the causes.
- At 1:37 pm on June 20, we started transferring accumulated water in the basement of the turbine building of Unit 2 to Condenser, turbine building, Unit 1. At 5:09 pm on June 21, we stopped to transfer.
- At 9:56 am on June 22, we began to transfer the accumulated water from the vertical shaft of Unit 2 to the Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility

(Process Main Building).

- At 9:02 am on June 27, due to the changeover of power source inside the power station, we temporarily stopped transfer of paddle water from the pit, Unit 2 to Central Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility. At 5:07 pm, we resumed the operation.

<Improvement of working environment>

- We installed local exhausters and started to operate them at 12:42 pm on June 11 in order to improve the working environment inside the reactor building.
- At 12:12 pm on June 19, we stopped local exhausters in the primary containment vessel of Unit 2 due to switching the power in the site. At 4:22 pm on the same day we resumed their operation.
- At 8:51 pm on June 19 we began to open the air lock, while coordinating a degree of its opening. Then we confirmed a result of monitoring dose rate in the air and evaluated there was no impact in the surrounding area. At 5:00 am on June 20 we fully opened the air lock. At 2:30 pm on June 20, we opened the large equipment carry-in entrance of R/B.

<Injection of nitrogen gas into Primary Containment Vessel>

- At 8:06 pm on June 28, we started to inject nitrogen gas into the Primary Containment Vessel of Unit 2.

<Others>

- Lights in the main control room were turned on at approx. 4:46pm, March 26.
- Some of turbine building lights were turned on April 2.
- From 1:42pm to 2:33pm, April 18, the condition (radiation dose, temperature, oxygen density) inside the reactor building of Unit 2 was observed by a remote-controlled robot
- From 11:15 am to 12:00 pm on June 22, we installed a temporary reactor



pressure indicator.

### [Unit 3]

~~At 6:50am, March 14th, the pressure in the reactor containment vessel increased to 530 kPa. Thus, at 7:44am, it was determined that a specific incident stipulated in the Article 15, the Clause 1 of Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness occurred (abnormal increase of the pressure of reactor containment vessel). Afterwards, the pressure gradually decreased (as of 9:05 am, March 14, 490 kPa).~~

\* We announced in our past reports that "On March 14, the pressure in the primary containment vessel increased and it was determined that a specific incident stipulated in the Article 15, the Clause 1 of Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness occurred". However, we made a mistake in the calculation of the pressure value and the status of Unit 3 did not fall under the above-mentioned specific incidents. We will delete the related description from our latest report.

- At approximately 11:01am, March 14, an explosion followed by white smoke occurred near Unit 3. 4 TEPCO employees and 3 workers from partner companies (all of them were conscious) sustained injuries and were taken to the hospital by ambulances.
- Since 6:15am, March 17, the pressure of the Suppression Chamber temporarily increased, on March 20, we were preparing for implementing measures to reduce the pressure of the reactor containment vessel (partial discharge of air containing radioactive material to outside) in order to fully secure safety. However, at present, it is not a situation to immediately implement such measures and discharge air containing radioactive material to outside. We will continue monitoring the status of the pressure of the reactor containment vessel.
- At approx. 3:55pm, March 21, we confirmed light gray smoke was arising from the southeast side of the roof of the reactor building. The situation was reported to the fire department at approx. 4:21pm. The parameters of reactor pressure vessel, reactor containment vessel, and monitored figures at the surrounding areas

remained stable without any significant changes. However, workers around Unit 3 evacuated indoors as a precautionary measure. On March 22, the color of smoke changed to somewhat white and it was slowly disappearing.

- At approx. 4:20pm on March 23, we observed light black smoke was belching from the reactor building. The situation was reported to the fire department at approx. 4:25pm. The parameters of the reactor, the reactor containment vessel, and monitored figures at the surrounding area remained stable without any significant changes. Just to be safe, workers around Unit 3 evacuated indoors. At approx. 11:30pm on March 23 and 4:50am on March 24, TEPCO employees confirmed the smoke has disappeared. Accordingly, workers evacuation was lifted.
- At approx. 4:30 pm, May 18, the first workers went into the reactor building after the occurrence of white smoke.

#### <Water injection to the reactor>

- High Pressure Coolant Injection System automatically stopped. We endeavored to restart the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System but failed. Also, we could not confirm the water inflow of Emergency Core Cooling System. As such, we decided at 5:10am, Mar 13, and we reported and/or noticed the government agencies concerned to apply the clause 1 of the Article 15 of Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness at 5:58am, Mar 13. At 9:25am, Mar 13, the injection of water with boric acid and which absorbs neutron using the fire pump to the reactor was started.
- At 6:02pm on March 25, the injection of fresh water to the reactor was started (switched from the seawater injection). At 8:30pm on March 28, the fire pump used to inject water was replaced by temporary motor driven pumps. From 10:03 am to 12:16pm on April 3, the fire pump was temporarily used for the water injection in order to switch the power of the motor driven pump from temporary power to the off-site power. It was again switched to the motor driven pump, and the fresh water injection is continued.

- Water injection to the reactor was temporarily suspended due to partial shutdown of the off-site power caused by the earthquake which occurred at approximately 5:16pm, April 11th. Following the restoration of off-site power, water injection was resumed at approximately 6:04pm.
- At 5:00 pm, on April 15, we had completed transferring emergency power sources to spray water to the reactor to the upland.
- On April 18, in order to replace hoses, which were used to inject water to the reactor, injecting water was temporarily suspended. After replacement, we restarted injecting water by pumps
- Before the work to connect high voltage power panels of Unit 1/2 and Unit 5/6 was initiated, the power source of pumps to inject water to reactors to a temporary diesel generator was switched at 10:57 am on April 25. Offsite power was restored at 6:25 pm.
- At 10:09 am May 4, we increased the volume of water injection to the reactor from approximately 7m<sup>3</sup>/h to 9m<sup>3</sup>/h, following an increase of temperature at the reactor pressure vessel.
- At 4:53 pm on May 12, as a part of work to switch the water injection line to the nuclear reactor of Unit 3 from the fire extinction system piping arrangement to the reactor feed water system piping arrangement, we started water injection through the reactor feed water system piping arrangement at approximately 3 m<sup>3</sup>/h in addition to the fire extinction system piping arrangement at approximately 9 m<sup>3</sup>/h. At 4:01 pm on May 13, we changed water injection amount to through the fire extinction system piping arrangement at approximately 6 m<sup>3</sup>/h and the reactor feed water system piping arrangement at approximately 6 m<sup>3</sup>/h. At 10:01 am on May 14, we increased water injection to the nuclear reactor of Unit 3 through the fire extinction system piping arrangement from at approximately 6 m<sup>3</sup>/h to 9 m<sup>3</sup>/h. (water injection thorough the reactor feed water system piping arrangement is maintained at approximately 6 m<sup>3</sup>/h).
- At 2:33 pm, on May 15, started injection of boric acid to the reactor and finished at 5:00 pm, May 15.
- At 10:11 am, May 17, amount of water injection to Unit 3 reactor by feed water system piping was increased from approx. 6m<sup>3</sup>/h to approx. 9 m<sup>3</sup>/h.
- At 2:15 pm, May 20, amount of water injection to Unit 3 reactor by feed water system piping was increased from approx. 9m<sup>3</sup>/h to approx. 12 m<sup>3</sup>/h. At 5:39 on the same day, amount of water by fire protection system piping was gradually decreased from approximately 9 m<sup>3</sup>/h, reached to 6m<sup>3</sup>/h at 11:54 pm.
- In order to switch the facility for water injection to the reactor from reactor feed water system piping arrangement to electric water-injection pump placed on a hill, the conventional fire pump was stopped at 3:12pm on May 21 and electric water-injection pump was started up at 3:15pm (we maintained the amount of injection water at about 13.5m<sup>3</sup>/h\*). \* Adjustment in the amount of injecting water due to the replacement of the flow meter (about 12m<sup>3</sup>/h 13.5m<sup>3</sup>/h).
- On May 23, we changed the rate of water injection to Unit 3 through the fire extinction system piping arrangement from approximately 6m<sup>3</sup>/h to approximately 5m<sup>3</sup>/h at 11:31 am and from approximately 5m<sup>3</sup>/h to approximately 4m<sup>3</sup>/h at 2:08 pm. We changed the rate of water injection through the fire extinction system piping arrangement from approximately 4m<sup>3</sup>/h to approximately 3m<sup>3</sup>/h at 5:19pm.
- At 8:52 pm on May 26, we changed the rate of water injection to the reactor through the fire extinction system piping arrangement from approximately 3m<sup>3</sup>/h to approximately 2 m<sup>3</sup>/h.
- At 8:42 pm on May 27, we changed the rate of water injection to the reactor of unit3 through the fire extinction system piping arrangement from approximately 2m<sup>3</sup>/h to approximately 1 m<sup>3</sup>/h.
- At 8:54 pm on May 28, we stopped water injection to the reactor of Unit 3 through the fire extinction system.
- At 10:19 am on May 31, we changed rate of water injection through the reactor feed water system piping arrangement from approximately 13.5 m<sup>3</sup>/h to approximately 12.5 m<sup>3</sup>/h.
- At 10:10 am on June 1, we changed rate of water injection through the reactor feed water system piping arrangement from approximately 12.5 m<sup>3</sup>/h to

approximately 11.5 m<sup>3</sup>/h.

- At 1:16 pm on June 3, freshwater injection was suspended due to re-routing of the water supply line to the reactor. At 1:32 pm on June 3, freshwater injection was resumed.
- At 1:02 pm on June 14, water injection was temporarily suspended due to the switch of injection pipeline to Unit 3 reactor. Water injection was resumed at 1:31 pm.
- At 10:06 am on June 21 we changed the rate of water injection to Unit 3 Reactor from approx. 11 m<sup>3</sup>/h to approx. 10m<sup>3</sup>/h through reactor feed water system piping arrangement.
- At 10:13 am on June 23, we changed the volume of water injected through reactor feed water system from approx. 10.0m<sup>3</sup>/h to approx. 9.5m<sup>3</sup>/h.
- At 10:07 am on June 24, we changed the water amount injected to Unit 3 through reactor feed water system piping arrangement from approx. 9.5m<sup>3</sup>/h to approx. 9 m<sup>3</sup>/h.
- At 4:20 pm on June 27, in addition to injecting water from the filter tank, we started to use treated water. At 5:55 pm, we stopped supplying treated water.
- At 2:36 pm on June 28, we started to operate the transfer pumps of water treatment system. After confirming no leakage and adjusting water volume, we started to operate circulating injection cooling at 3:55 pm, June 28.
- At 10:59 am on June 29, we stopped the transfer pumps, and started it at 1:12 pm. At 1:33 pm on June 29, we started to operate circulating injection cooling.

<Water spray to the spent fuel pool>

[Freshwater spray]

- From 7:05pm to 8:07pm, March 17 the police and Self-Defense Forces sprayed fresh water by water cannon trucks upon our request for the cooperation.
- From around 2:00pm to 2:45 pm, March 18 Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces sprayed fresh water by water cannon trucks upon our request for the cooperation.

[Seawater spray]

- Upon our request for the cooperation, spraying water to the upper part of the reactor building by helicopters with the support of the Self Defense Forces was considered on March 16. However the operation was cancelled.
- From approx. 9:30am to past 10:00am, March 17, water was sprayed by helicopters upon our request for the cooperation to Self-Defense Forces.
- From approx. 12:30am to 1:10am, March 19, water was sprayed with the cooperation of Fire Rescue Task Forces of Tokyo Fire Department. They resumed the operation from approx. 2:10pm to 3:40am, March 20.
- From approx. 9:36pm, March 20th to 3:58am, March 21, water was sprayed with the cooperation of Fire Rescue Task Forces of Tokyo Fire Department.
- From approx. 3:10pm to 3:59pm, March 22, water was sprayed with the cooperation of Fire Rescue Task Forces of Tokyo Fire Department.
- Sea water was injected through Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System);
  - From approx. 11:03am to 1:20pm on March 23
  - From approx. 5:35am to 4:05pm on March 24
- From 1:28pm to 4:00pm, March 25, water was sprayed with the cooperation of Fire Rescue Task Forces of Tokyo Fire Department.
- From approx. 12:34pm to 2:36pm, March 27, water was sprayed by the concrete pumping vehicle.

[Freshwater spray]

- From approx. 2:17pm to 6:18pm, March 29, fresh water was sprayed by the concrete pumping vehicle (switched to fresh water spray).
- Fresh water was sprayed by the concrete pumping vehicle;
  - From 4:30pm to 7:33pm, March 31 / From 9:52am to 12:54pm, April 2
  - From 5:03pm to 7:19pm, April 4 / From 6:53am to 8:53am, April 7
  - From 5:06pm to 8:00pm, April 8 / From 5:15pm to 7:15pm, April 10
  - From 4:26pm to 5:16pm, April 12 / From 3:56pm to 4:32pm, April 14

- From 2:17pm to 3:02pm, April 18/ From 2:19pm to 3:40pm, April 22
- From 1:40pm to 2:00pm on April 22, we injected fresh water by the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System) on a trial basis.
- On April 26, spraying of fresh water by concrete pumping vehicle was conducted (for around 2 minutes) in order to check the water level of spent fuel pool. After that, from 12:25 pm to 2:02 pm, fresh water injection by Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System) was conducted.
- On May 8, water was injected through Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System) from 12:10 pm to 2:10 pm.
- At 12:14 pm on May 9, we started injection of freshwater into Unit 3 spent fuel pool using Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System) (from 12:39 pm to 2:36pm, hydrazine was also injected). The injection was finished at 3:00pm.
- At 3:00 pm on May 16, we started injection of freshwater into Unit 3 spent fuel pool using Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System) (from 3:10 pm to 5:30 pm, hydrazine was also injected). The injection was finished at 6:32 pm.
- At 10:15 am on May 24, we started injection of freshwater into Unit 3 spent fuel pool using Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System) (from 10:20 am to 0:56 pm, hydrazine was also injected). The injection was finished at 1:35 pm.
- At 1:28 pm on May 28, we started freshwater injection to the spent fuel pool of Unit 3 by Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System) (we also injected hydrazine from 1:42 pm to 2:40 pm). The injection was finished at 3:08 pm.
- From 2:34 pm to 3:54 pm on June 1, we injected freshwater into Unit 3 spent fuel pool through Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System) (Hydrazine was injected from 2:41 pm to 3:26 pm on June 1 at the same time).
- From 1:08 pm to 3:14 pm on June 5, we injected freshwater into Unit 3 spent fuel pool through Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System) (Hydrazine was injected from 1:14 pm to 2:16 pm on June 5 at the same time).

- From 1:42 pm to 3:31 pm on June 9, we injected freshwater into Unit 3 spent fuel pool through Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System) (Hydrazine was injected from 1:45 pm to 2:40 pm at the same time).
- From 10:09 am to 11:48 am on June 13, we injected freshwater into Unit 3 spent fuel pool through Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System) (Hydrazine was injected from 10:13 am to 11:36 am at the same time).
- From 10:19 am to 11:57 am on June 17, we injected freshwater into Unit 3 spent fuel pool through Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System) (Hydrazine was injected from 10:23 am to 11:31 am at the same time)
- From 9:56 am to 11:23 am on June 26, we injected boric acid into Unit 3 spent fuel pool through Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System
- From 3:00 pm to 5:18 pm on June 27, we injected boric acid into spent fuel pool through Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System.
- From 2:45 pm to 3:53 pm on June 29, we injected fresh water into the spent fuel pool using Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering System.

< Nuclide analysis of spent fuel pool water >

- On May 8, we took approximately 40ml of pool water using concrete pumping vehicle, in order to check the status within the spent fuel pool. On May 10, we conducted a nuclide analysis with the collected pool water, and detected Cesium-134, Cesium-136, Cesium-137, and Iodine-131.

< Alternative cooling of spent fuel pool >

- At 7:47 pm on June 30, we started the Alternative Cooling System of spent fuel pool of Unit 3. It was under adjustment operation. After performance evaluation, we brought to a full operation at 11:00 am on July 1.

< Draining water from the underground floor of the turbine building >

- In order to drain the accumulated water in the basement of the turbine building to a condenser, at approx. 5:40pm, March 28, the water in a condensate storage

tank was started to be transferred to suppression pool's water surge-tanks. At approx. 8:40am, March 31, transfer was completed.

- In order to change the water injection line into the reactor to Reactor Feed Water System, draining water from the condenser in the turbine building was started at 4:18pm on May 8. We cut a part of pipes of Reactor Feed Water System.
- On May 10, laying out transferring pipes to transfer the accumulated water in the turbine building to Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility was started and completed on May 11. On May 12, we completed a leak check. On May 17, we finished a leak check on transferring pipes and started to transfer at 6:04 pm (approx. 12m<sup>3</sup>/h). Transfer was suspended at 9:10am May 25 in order to check the transfer lines and buildings.
- From 12:50 pm on June 2, we started transferring water from the condenser to the condensate storage tank to drain water in the basement of the turbine building to a condenser. At 9:56 pm on June 4 we stopped transferring water.
- At 6:26 pm on June 5, we started transferring the accumulated water at the basement of Turbine Building to the condenser. At 10:44 pm on June 9 we stopped transferring water.
- At 3:30 pm on June 11, we started transferring the accumulated water at the basement of Turbine Building to the Centralized Waste Treatment Facility (Process Main Building). At 5:01 pm on June 12, we finished the transfer.
- At 10:05 am on June 14 to 8:46 am on June 16, we transferred we started transferring the accumulated water at the basement of Turbine Building to the Centralized Waste Treatment Facility (Process Main Building).
- At 1:31 pm on June 18 we started transferring water accumulated in the basement of the turbine building to Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility (Miscellaneous Solid Waste Volume Reduction Treatment Building). At 12:02 am on June 20, the transfer was finished.
- At 3:32 pm on June 21, we started to transfer accumulated water in the basement of turbine buildings to central waste treatment facility (process building). At 3:44 pm on June 27, we suspended the operation of transferring pumps. At 5:00 pm,

we resumed the operation of 2 transferring pumps.

- At 9:58 am on June 28, we stopped transferring accumulated water in turbine building basement of Unit 3 to central waste treatment facility building.
- At 8:56 am on June 30, we started transferring the accumulated water from the basement of the turbine building of Unit 3 to Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility (Process Building).

<Others>

- Lights in the main control room were turned on at approx. 10:45pm on March 22.
- Some of turbine building lights were turned on April 2.
- From 11:30am to 2:00pm, April 17, the condition (radiation dose, temperature, oxygen density) inside the reactor building of Unit 3 was observed by a remote-controlled robot.
- On May 10, in order to place an alternative cooling facility, we started removing the debris using robots and unmanned heavy machinery. Operation was completed on June 7.
- From 11:47 am to 12:14 pm on June 9, TEPCO employees entered into Unit 3 reactor building and conducted radiation dose survey by camera as a preparation for the nitrogen injection into the PCV.
- From 3:33 pm to 3:53 pm on June 13, we sampled radioactive materials in the ambient air at the opening of the Reactor Building. We will analyze and evaluate.
- At 11:43 am on July 1, we started cleaning up the first floor of reactor building of Unit 3 using a robot.

## **[Unit 4]**

- At approx. 6:00am, March 15, an explosive sound was heard and the damage in the 5th floor roof of Unit 4 reactor building was confirmed. At 9:38am, the fire near the northwest part of 4th floor of Unit 4 reactor building was confirmed. At approx. 11:00am, TEPCO employees confirmed that the fire was extinguished.
- At approx. 5:45am on March 16, a TEPCO employee discovered a fire at the

northwest corner of the reactor building. TEPCO immediately reported this incident to the fire department and the local government and proceeded with the extinction of fire. At approx. 6:15am, TEPCO employee confirmed at the site that there were no sign of fire.

<Water spray to the spent fuel pool>

[Freshwater spray]

- From 8:21am to 9:40am, March 20, water was sprayed by fire engines with the cooperation of Self-Defense Forces. From approx. 6:30pm to 7:46pm on the same day, water was sprayed by Self-Defense Forces' fire engines.
- From 6:37am to 8:41am, March 21, water was sprayed by fire engines with the cooperation of Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces.

[Seawater spray]

- Seawater was sprayed by the concrete pumping vehicle;
  - From 5:17pm to 8:32pm, March 22.
  - From 10:00am to 1:02pm March 23
  - From 2:36pm to approx. 5:30pm March 24
- From 6:05am to 10:20am, March 25, sea water was injected by the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System).
- Seawater was sprayed by the concrete pumping vehicle;
  - From 7:05pm to 10:07pm, March 25 / From 4:55pm to 7:25pm March 27

[Freshwater spray]

- From 2:04pm to 6:33pm March 30th, fresh water was sprayed by the concrete pumping vehicle (water spray was switched to fresh water)
- Fresh water was sprayed by the concrete pumping vehicle;
  - From 8:28am to 2:14pm, April 1/From 5:14pm to 10:16pm, April 3
  - From 5:35pm to 6:22pm, April 5/From 6:23pm to 7:40pm, April 7
  - From 5:07pm to 7:24pm, April 9/From 12:30am to 6:57am, April 13

- From 2:30pm to 6:29pm, April 15/From 5:39pm to 9:22pm, April 17
  - From 10:17am to 11:35am, April 19/From 5:08pm to 8:31pm, April 20
  - From 5:14pm to 9:20pm, April 21/From 5:52pm to 11:53pm, April 22
  - From 12:30pm to 4:44pm, April 23 / From 12:25pm to 5:07pm, April 24
  - From 6:15pm on April 25 to 12:26am on April 26
  - From 4:50pm to 8:35pm, April 26
  - From 12:18pm to 2:01 pm and from 2:32pm to 3:15pm, April 27
  - From 12:19pm to 8:46 pm, May 5/ From 12:38 pm to 5:51 pm, May 6
  - From 2:05 pm to 5:30 pm, May 7 / From 4:30 pm to 7:30 pm, May 19
  - From 4:05 pm to 7:05 pm, May 9 (hydrazine: from 4:11 pm to 6:38 pm)
  - From 4:04 pm to 7:04 pm, May 13 (hydrazine: from 4:20 pm to 6:41 pm)
  - From 4:25 pm to 8:25 pm, May 15 (hydrazine: from 4:26 pm to 6:30 pm)
  - From 4:14 pm to 8:06 pm, May 17 (hydrazine: from 4:40 pm to 6:35 pm)
  - From 4:00 pm to 7:56 pm, May 21 (hydrazine: from 4:23 pm to 7:00 pm)
  - From 4:00 pm to 7:09 pm, May 23 (hydrazine: from 4:08 pm to 6:30 pm)
  - From 4:36 pm to 8:04 pm, May 25 (hydrazine: from 4:42 pm to 6:49 pm)
  - From 5:05 pm to 8:00 pm, May 27 (hydrazine: from 5:24 pm to 6:53 pm)
  - From 5:56 pm to 7:45 pm, May 28 (hydrazine: from 6:02 pm to 7:45 pm)
  - From 2:35 pm to 9:15 pm, June 3 (hydrazine: from 2:44 pm to 6:58 pm)
  - From 2:23 pm to 7:45 pm, June 4 (hydrazine: from 2:44 pm to 6:41 pm)
  - From 3:56 pm to 6:35 pm, June 6 (hydrazine: from 4:15 pm to 5:45 pm)
  - From 4:12 pm to 7:41 pm, June 8 (hydrazine: from 4:16 pm to 6:05 pm)
  - From 4:36 pm to 9:00 pm, June 13 (hydrazine: from 4:38 pm to 7:15 pm)
  - From 4:10 pm to 8:52 pm, June 14 (hydrazine: from 4:11 pm to 7:15 pm)
- Implementation of water injection through alternative water injection line
    - From 1:14 pm to 3:44 pm, June 16 (hydrazine: from 1:48 pm to 3:18 pm)
    - From 4:05 pm to 7:23 pm, June 18 (hydrazine: from 4:29 pm to 6:33 pm)
    - From 2:31 pm to 4:38 pm, June 22
    - From 11:30 am to 11:55 am, June 30

#### [Analysis of the water in the spent fuel pool]

- On April 12, in order to confirm the status of the inside of the spent fuel pool, we collected approximately 200ml of water from the pool using the concrete pumping vehicle. On April 13, we conducted nuclide analysis and detected Cesium-134, Cesium-137, and Iodine-131. Later we conducted detailed analysis, and on May 31 we concluded that the large portion of spent fuel is sound.
- From April 22, we installed the thermocouple-type thermometer and the radiation dose meter to the concrete pumping vehicle at the spent fuel pool of Unit 4 and we investigated the water level of pool, water temperature, radiation dose, water analysis etc. As part of the investigation, we sampled 150 ml of water from the pool on April 28 and conducted nuclide analysis on April 29. As a result of the analysis, cesium 134, 137 and iodine 131 were detected. We sampled 280 ml of water from the pool on May 7 and conducted nuclide analysis on May 8. As a result of the analysis, cesium 134, 137 and iodine 131 were detected.

#### <Installation of support structure for the base of Spent Fuel Pool>

- On May 9, preparatory work to install support structure was started. On June 6, preparatory work has completed.
- On June 7, installation and construction of post material made of steel are commenced.
- On June 20, installation of post material made of steel for the base of Spent Fuel Pool has completed.

#### <Water injection into the reactor well and the equipment storage pool of Unit 4>

- From 9:14 am to 11:57 am on June 19, we injected fresh water into the reactor well and equipment storage pool of Unit 4 in order to decrease the exposure dose in the 5<sup>th</sup> floor of the reactor building of Unit 4 for working there.
- At 9:49 am on June 20, in order to lower dose during work at 5FL, R/B, Unit 4, we started freshwater injection to Reactor well and equipment storage pool. At 12:52 pm on June 21 the injection was stopped.

- At 8:23 am on June 22, we started injecting fresh water to reactor dry well and dry separator pit.
- From 8:23 am to 2:31 pm on June 22, we injected fresh water into the reactor well of Unit 4 and the equipment storage pool and finished at 3:29 pm.
- At 9:40 am on June 28, we started injecting fresh water to reactor dry well and dry separator pit and finished at 3:29 pm, June 28.

#### <Others>

- On March 21, cabling was completed from the temporary substation to the reactor building.
- Lights in the main control room were turned on at 11:50am on March 29.
- Some of turbine building lights were turned on March 31.
- From 2:17 pm to 2:37 pm on May 23, we sampled, on a trial basis, radioactive materials in the ambient air at the opening of the Reactor Building, Unit 4. As a result of analysis, Iodine 134, Cesium 134, and Cesium 137 were detected.
- On June 18, we sampled radioactive materials in the ambient air at the opening of the Reactor Building of Unit 4. As a result of the analysis, Cesium-134 and Cesium-137 were detected.

#### **[Unit 5]**

- At 5:00am on March 19, we started cooling the spent fuel pool of Unit 5 by activating the Residual Heat Removal System Pump (C).
- Unit 5 has been in reactor cold shutdown since 2:30pm on March 20.
- In order to prevent hydrogen gas from accumulating within the buildings, we have made three holes on the roof of the reactor building for Unit 5.
- At approx. 5:24pm on March 23, the temporary Residual Heat Removal System Seawater Pump automatically stopped when its power source was switched. We restarted the pump at 4:14pm, March 24, and resumed cooling of reactors at 4:35pm.
- Regarding the work to connect high voltage power panels of Unit 1/2 and Unit 5/6,

the pump of the residual heat removal system to cool the reactor and spent fuel pool in Unit 5 was stopped from 12:22 pm on April 25. At 4:43pm on the same day, we restated the pump.

- From March 27 to May 2, transfer of accumulated water in Unit 5 turbine building to a condenser was conducted (approximately 600m<sup>3</sup>).
- At 9:14 pm on May 28, we found that one temporary residual heat removal system seawater pump of Unit 5 stopped. At 8:12 am on May 29, replacement work to the spare pump started. After finishing the replacement work, we started the pump at 12:31 pm, and restarted cooling from 12:49 pm.
- At 9:00 am on June 8, we suspended the Residual Heat Removal System Pump (C) in order to increase one more pump. Two pumps resumed at 0:35 pm on the same day.
- At 4:35 on June 24, the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering (Clean up) System) was activated and we start cooling of spent fuel pool by such system and of reactor by residual heat removal system pump.
- We started operations for emergency diesel generator (A) at 6:03 pm on June 28 and emergency diesel generator (B) at 12:32 pm on June 28 respectively in Unit 5.

## [Unit 6]

- At 10:14pm March 19, we started cooling the spent fuel pool of Unit 6 by activating the Residual Heat Removal System Pump (B).
- Unit 6 has been in reactor cold shutdown since 7:27pm on March 20.
- In order to prevent hydrogen gas from accumulating within the buildings, we have made three holes on the roof of the reactor building for Unit 6.
- From 11:00 am to 3:00 pm on April 19, accumulated water from the basement of the turbine building of Unit 6 was transferred into the condenser.
- The transfer of accumulated water in Unit 6 turbine building to a temporary tank was started at 2 pm on May 1. At 5:00 pm, on May 1, transfer pump was stopped (approximately 119.8m<sup>3</sup>). After that, the results of the transfer are shown below.
  - From 10:00 am to 4:00 pm on May 2 (approximately 222.3m<sup>3</sup>)

- From 2:00 pm to 5:00 pm on May 3 (approximately 124.1m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 2:00 pm to 5:00 pm on May 6 (approximately 111.7m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 10:00 am to 3:00 pm on May 7 (approximately 184.1m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 2:00pm to 5:00 pm on May 9 (approximately 94.7m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 10:00 am to 4:00pm on May 10 (approximately 118.2m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 10:00 am to 4:00 pm on May 11 (approximately 118.9m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 10:00 am to 4:00 pm on May 12 (approximately 116.9m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 10:00 am to 3:00 pm on May 13 (approximately 102.2m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 10:00 am to 3:00 pm on May 14 (approximately 96.3m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 10:00 am to 3:00 pm on May 15 (approximately 94.3m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 10:00 am to 2:00 pm on May 16 (approximately 76.6m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 10:00 am to 2:00 pm on May 17 (approximately 75.3m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 10:00 am to 2:00 pm on May 18 (approximately 83.6m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 2:00 pm to 6:00 pm on May 21 (approximately 45.3m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 9:00 am to 7:00 pm on May 24 (approximately 201.0m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 9:00 am to 7:00 pm on May 25 (approximately 378.0m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 9:00 am to 7:00 pm on May 26 (approximately 378.0m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 9:00 am to 7:00 pm on May 27 (approximately 381.5m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 9:00 am to 7:00 pm on May 28 (approximately 382.2m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 9:00 am to 7:00 pm on May 29 (approximately 378.4m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 10:00 am to 5:30 pm on May 30 (approximately 250.7m<sup>2</sup>)
- From 2:00 pm on June 2nd to 2:00 pm on June 5, from 2:45 pm on June 5 to 6:00 pm on June 8 (Total: approximately 5,298.1m<sup>2</sup>)
- From 9:00 am on June 9 to 6:00 pm on June 9 (approximately 271.3m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 10:00 am to 3:00 pm on June11 (approximately 199.6m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 10:00 am to 3:00 pm on June 12 (approximately 147.1m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 10:00 am to 4:00 pm on June 13 (approximately 112.3m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 10:00 am to 4:00 pm on June 14 (approximately 57.6m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 10:00 am to 4:00 pm on June 15 (approximately 52.6m<sup>3</sup>)
- From 10:00 am to 4:00 pm on June 16 (approximately 55.7m<sup>3</sup>)



From 10:00 am to 4:00 pm on June 17 (approximately 42.9m<sup>3</sup>)

From 10:00 am to 4:00 pm on June 18 (approximately 60.5m<sup>3</sup>)

From 10:00 am to 4:00 pm on June 19 (approximately 59.7m<sup>3</sup>)

From 10:00 am to 4:00pm on June 20 (approximately 63.5m<sup>3</sup>)

From 10:00 am to 4:00 pm on June 21 (approximately 71.3m<sup>3</sup>)

From 10:00 am to 4:00 pm on June 22 (approximately 44.3m<sup>3</sup>)

From 3:00 pm to 7:00 pm on June 30 (under evaluation of transferred amount)

From 10:00 am on July 1, (now transferred)

- From 11:00am to 12:30am May 10, we conducted water transfer from the reactor building to the accessory building for reactors (the radiation waste treatment building) (Approximately 10 m<sup>3</sup>). The results are shown below.

From 11:00 am to 12:30 pm on May 10

From 11:00 am to 12:30 pm on May 11

From 11:00 am to 12:30 pm on May 12

From 11:30 am to 12:15 pm on May 13

From 10:30 am to 12:30 pm on May 18

From 10:20 am to 12:10 pm on May 28

From 10:05 am to 12:40 pm on June 8

From 11:55 am to 2:00 pm on June 15

From 11:05 am to 1:30 pm on June 21

From 11:00 am to 1:20 pm on June 28

- At 12:00 pm on June 28, TEPCO worker found the water level gauge (manometer) of temporary tank where accumulated water from turbine building in Unit 6 is being transferred lying on the floor. Since accumulated water in temporary tank that is from turbine building basement at Unit 6 was leaking from the gauge, we stopped it by closing main valve. The amount of water leaked was approximately 15m<sup>3</sup>. For safety, we measured surface dose rate around and confirmed the result to be equivalent to that of surrounding area (7 μ Sv/h). Currently, we are investigating the details.

- At 1:00 pm on June 30, we started transferring of low radioactive stored water from temporary tank to Mega Float. Although a water blow was found on the surface of the transferring hose, we cure it and confirmed no leakages to outside.

- At 10:00 am on July 1, we started transferring low radioactive accumulated water, which had been transferred from turbine building of Unit 6, from temporary tank to Mega Float.

## **[Others]**

<Securing offsite power reliability>

- On March 18, with respect to Unit 2, receiving electricity from the external transmission line to the auxiliary power transformation installation was completed. At 3:46 pm on March 20, after laying the cables from the installation towards the building side, receiving electricity by the load panel on the load side was started.
- At 10:23 am on April 19, connection work between high voltage switchgear of Unit 1&2 and Unit 3&4 was completed.
- Before the work to connect high voltage power panels of Unit 1/2 and Unit 5/6 was initiated, the power source of pumps to inject water to reactors was switched to a temporary diesel generator at 10:57 am on April 25. At 6:25pm on April 25th, the power source was switched back to the power system. The pump to inject nitrogen to Unit 1 was stopped from 2:10 pm on April 25. At 7:10pm on the same day, we restated the pump. The pump of the residual heat removal system to cool the reactor and spent fuel pool in Unit 5 was stopped from 12:22 pm on April 25. At 4:43pm on the same day, we restated the pump.
- Since April 26, aiming to increase the power supply capacity in future as well as to strengthen the insulation, we have switched the power source of Unit 3 & 4 from the current "Okuma line No.3" to "Toden Gensiryoku line" in line with the construction work to raise the voltage of the offsite power of Unit 3 & 4 from 6.9 kV to 66 kV. On April 30, we finished upgrading the voltage and switching the power source of Unit 3 & 4 to "Okuma line No.3".
- Okuma Line No.2 (275,000 V) has been restored. Since 3:20 pm on May 11, Unit 1 and 2 are receiving power partly from the line.

- At 7:35 pm, May 17, we completed the switch of power for the power station by the increase of voltage of Okuma Line No.3.

<Detection of radioactive materials>

[Soil]

- Plutonium has been detected from the sample of soil at the site of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station collected on March 21, 22, 25, 28, 31, April 4, 7, 11,14, 21, 25, 28, May 2, 5, 9, 12, 16,19, 23, 26 ,30 , June 2, 6 and 9. We strengthened environmental monitoring of power station and surrounding environment just in case. As a result of nuclide analysis of gamma (  $\gamma$  )-rays of the soil using the aforementioned sample, additionally, Iodine, Cesium, Tellurium, Barium, Niobium, Ruthenium, Molybdenum, Technetium, Lanthanum, Beryllium, Silver have been detected.
- We collected the soil at the site of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on March 28, April 4, 11, 25, May 2, 9, 16 and 30 and as a result of uranium assay, detected Uranium-234, 235 and 238 which are the same level as that occurs naturally.
- Out of the soil samples gathered on March 28, April 4, 11, 25, May 2, and 9 we conducted the nuclides analysis on samples from which Plutonium were detected to confirm Americium and Curium. We detected Americium 241 and Curium 242, 243 and 244.
- Strontium 89 and 90 have been detected from samples collected on April 18 and May 9 from 3 regular sampling points.

[Air]

- The values of radioactive materials (iodine, etc) measured contained in the air at the site exceeded normal figures. It was determined that a specific incident stipulated in article 15, clause 1 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Extraordinary increase of radiation dose at site boundary) had occurred;
  - 4:17pm on March 12 (near MP 4)

- 8:56am on March 13 (near MP 4)
- 2:15pm on March 13 (near MP 4)
- 3:50am on March 14 (near MP 6)
- 4:15am on March 14 (near MP 2)
- 9:27am on March 14 (near MP 3)
- 9:37pm on March 14 (near the main gate of the station)
- 6:51am on March 15 (near the main gate of the station)
- 8:11am on March 15 (near the main gate of the station)
- 4:17pm on March 15 (near the main gate of the station)
- 11:05pm on March 15 (near the main gate of the station)
- 8:58am on March 19 (near MP 5)

- We detected radioactive materials in the air collected at the site of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on March 20, 21 and from March 23 to June 28. The data of three detected nuclides (Iodine-131, Cesium-134 and Cesium-137) were reported as fixed data. The valuation results of other nuclides were published based on the improved methods for recurrence prevention prepared in accordance to the strong warning by NISA on April 1.
- Since permanent monitoring posts (MPs 1 to 8) were restored, we keep monitoring and publicly announce the data from them.
- On May 20, we implemented improvement of environment for a part of 8 monitoring posts (No.8) installed at the boundary of station site, by decontamination of detector and installation of cover under the detector. On May 23, we improved the environment around a monitoring post No.3 by decontaminating the detector and installing a shield to the lower half of the detector.

[Water]

- On March 21 and from March 23 to June 28, we detected radioactive materials from the seawater around the discharge canal of the station. The data of three detected nuclides (Iodine-131, Cesium-134 and Cesium-137) were reported as

fixed data. The valuation results of other nuclides were published based on the improved methods for recurrence prevention prepared in accordance to the strong warning by NISA on April 1.

We analyzed strontium in seawater collected on May 9 and 16 and detected strontium 89 and 90.

We detected Tritium in the Tritium analysis contained in the seawater sampled at the water intake on June 13.

- We detected radioactive materials contained in the accumulated water in the turbine buildings of Units 1 to 4. As a preparation for treating the water, we conducted water analysis and detected radioactive materials. The analysis of water was carried out in Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station with support from other nuclear institutions and companies (Japan Atomic Energy Agency and Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited).
- At approx. 3:30pm, March 27, we found water accumulating in vertical shafts of trenches outside of the turbine buildings for Units 1 to 3. The radiation dose at the surface of the water amounted 0.4 mSv/h (Unit 1) and over 1,000 mSv/h (Unit 2). We could not confirm the amount of the radiation dose as for Unit 3. We keep observing the condition of the water in the vertical shaft. No significant changes in water level of the vertical shafts of the trenches for Units 1 to 3 were confirmed after the earthquake which occurred at approximately 5:16pm, April 11.
- We detected niobium, technetium, ruthenium, silver, tellurium, iodine, cesium, and ruthenium in the water collected at the trench of Unit 1 on March 29. We took samples from the water in the trench of Units 2, 3, 5 and 6 on March 30, and conducted nuclide analysis on them.
- At approx. 9:30am, April 2, we found that there was accumulated water in the shaft (concrete product) for storing power cables near the intake of water for Unit 2, that the airborne radiation was over 1,000mSv/h and that the water spilled into the sea from the crack (approx. 20 cm) on the side of the shaft. Since there is a joint between the trench of Unit 2 and the shaft, based on the possibility that the accumulated water in the turbine building of Unit 2 was spilled into the sea

through this joint, we injected fresh concrete to the shaft twice, however, we could not observe any changes in the amount of water flowing into the sea. Therefore, we considered that a new method to stop the water and determined to use the polymer. On April 4th, we injected the tracer from the vertical shaft to examine the flow path. We did not observe reduction of flow or change of color of water leaked. We checked the drawings and confirmed the route. At the same time, we checked the situation of the pit in detail and considered the possibility that the water did not come from the pit, rather, from the joint between the piping upstream of the pit and the duct, then the water seeped through a layer of gravel below the piping. In order to stop that seepage from the layer of gravel, we decided to conduct the water sealing to the bedrock around the piping. We arranged specialists for water shutoff and procured required equipments. On April 5, liquid glass was injected to the bedrock. Tracer was put through the two new holes drilled near the pit to investigate the water flow. At 2:15pm, April 5, it was observed the water with tracer came out from the crack on the concrete wall of the pit. At 3:07pm, April 5, injection of coagulant from the holes was initiated and we confirmed the outflow from the crack on the concrete wall of the pit stopped at approximately 5:38am, April 6. We confirmed the water level has not been rising in the turbine building of Unit 2. On April 6, a countermeasure by using rubber plate and fixer was implemented to prevent discharge of radioactive materials, and we are continuously monitoring for any existence of leakage. We used grout to stop the outflow, and finished the work on April 21. We are also planning to conduct countermeasures to prevent the outflow of accumulated water from the pit.

The amount of high density contaminated water spilled from the screen at the side of turbine building, Unit 2 is estimated to be about 520 m<sup>3</sup> with 4.7\*10<sup>15</sup> Bq, assuming that the water flowed continuously at the same pace from April 1 to April 6.

From 3:00pm April 5, construction of installing large sandbags around the pier to prevent the outflow of the contaminated water from station's port on the south side to the ocean was started. From April 15 to April 17, we threw in ten sandbags

including zeolite in front of the screen rooms of Units 1 to 4.

In order to prevent water containing radioactive materials from spilling from a plant's port to the sea, we installed 120 meter wide double silt fences around a breakwater on the south of the station at 10:45am on April 11. On April 12, 13 and 15, we installed a total of 7 iron plates in front of the screen of Unit 2. At 1:50pm on April 13, we installed silt fence (double layered) in front of Unit 3 and 4 screens. In addition, we are thinking about using other measures such as steel sheet pile or radioactive material absorber at around south breakwater.

Iodine and Cesium were detected from the water sampled in the pit and in the sea near the pit. On April 13, Iodine-131, Cesium-134 and Cesium-137 were detected from the water sampled in the pit and in the sea in front of the bar screen near the pit. Other nuclide will be re-evaluated. In addition, from April 2, we implemented sampling at 15km offshore Fukushima Daiichi and Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Stations. 3 points have been added since April 5. 4 points at 3km offshore Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and 2 points at 8km offshore have been newly added since April 17. On April 25, the monitoring at 5 locations at the offshore area of Ibaraki Prefecture was launched by Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. As part of its monitoring, Japan Coast Guard has conducted the sampling in seawater on April 29 and May 5. We, Tokyo Electric Power Company, have conducted the nuclide analyses of that seawater. Iodine -131, Cesium -134 and Cesium -137 were detected. We will evaluate these samples comprehensively hereafter. On May 5, we added samplings of upper and lower layers of 3km Souma-city offshore. From May 10 we will carry out the sampling of upper and lower layers at 6 points at 3 km offshore, and interval of the said sampling at 6 points will be changed to two times a week. On May 27, we added samplings of upper, middle and lower layers at 2 points at 30km offshore, and upper and lower layers at 2 points at 5km offshore, and interval of the said sampling at 4 points will be once a week. From June 21, we started to conduct the sampling 6 points at offshore in Miyagi prefecture. From 7:35pm on April 12, we started transferring accumulated water in the vertical shaft

of Unit 2 to the condenser. At 11:00am on April 13, we stopped transferring accumulated water to check whether there was water leakage from condenser or not. As we did not find any problem, we restarted transferring at 3:02 pm on the same day, and at 5:04 pm the scheduled transfer was completed.

- At 12:30 pm on May 11, a worker engaged in blocking work of the vertical shaft around the water intake of Unit 3 found some water flowing through the pipes that store power cables into the vertical shaft. At 4:05 pm on the same day, we confirmed that the water outflows out of the shaft into the sea. We therefore inserted cloths into the pipes that lead to the shaft and put some concrete in it and at 6:45 pm, we confirmed the outflow stopped. We will continuously monitor the situation of the water outflow and check the result of sea water samplings around the water intake of Unit 3 and routes of water inflow and outflow.

We estimated that the volume of outflow was approx. 250m<sup>3</sup> and the radioactive dose is approx.  $2 \times 10^{13}$  Bq on the assumption that it flew at the same rate for approx. 41 hours (from 2:00 am on May 10 to 7:00 pm on May 11). As preventive measures and measures to prevent scattering to the outside of the port, we are planning to block the pits the contaminated water might run flow out from, isolation of pump rooms for Units 1 to 4, installation of sandbags containing zeolite inside of the intakes, and installation of a circular purification equipment to the screen area. In parallel, we will continue monitoring sea water inside and outside of the port and reinforce the monitoring system.

On May 12, we conducted nuclide analysis on water in vertical shaft and neighborhood seawater, we detected Iodine-131, Cesium-134 and Cesium-137 on May 12th. We will conduct additional nuclide analysis.

At 10:30 on June 9, water flow test of circulating seawater purification facility located in the Unit 2 and 3 screen area was initiated. The test was completed at 3:00 pm.

At approximately 10:00 am on June 13, we started the operation of the circulating seawater purification facility installed at the screen area of Unit 2 and 3. At 10:00

am on June 18, we stopped operation.

- At 10:00 am on June 20, we started operation of the circulating seawater purification facility installed at the screen area, Units 2 and 3.
- We began to blockade each vertical shaft as a countermeasure against Tsunami on May 1, and have finished the work for Unit 2 and 3 on June 2. (We already blockaded the vertical shafts of Unit 4 on April 6.)
- For the screen pit of each unit, on June 10, we completed the task to blockade 39 pits where the possibility of water leakage can't be denied, as the countermeasure against the leakage of accumulated water.
- Since approx. 9:20am, March 31, the water transfer from the vertical shaft of Unit 1 to the reservoir of the centralized environmental facility was conducted. We finished the task around 11:25am of the same day.
- We found the accumulated water at the main process building of the centralized environmental facility. We analyzed and detected approx.  $1.2 \times 10^1 \text{Bq/cm}^3$  of radioactivity in full dose in the Controlled Area and  $2.2 \times 10^1 \text{Bq/cm}^3$  in full dose in the Non-Controlled Area on March 29. On April 2, the transfer of water accumulated in the central environment facility to the turbine building of Unit 4 was started for the purpose of the draining that water.
- From April 3, the water level in the trench of Unit 3 increased by 15 cm. The route is not yet known, but there is a possibility that water in the turbine building of Unit 4 may be running to the trench of Unit 3. To be safe, at 9:22am, April 4, we stopped transferring water to the turbine building of Unit 4. At this moment, the water level in the trench of Unit 3 became stable after stopping the water transfer.
- There is plenty of radioactive wastewater in the turbine buildings. Especially, Unit 2's wastewater is very highly radioactive. To store this stably, it was decided that this needed to be transferred to the Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility. However, in that facility, ten thousand tons of low level radioactive wastewater was already stored. In order to transfer more wastewater, we need to discharge the low level radioactive wastewater. In addition, as low radioactive

subsurface water is piling up in sub-drain pits of Units 5 and 6 and a part of subsurface water is running into buildings. We are concerned that important equipment to secure the safety of reactors may be submerged. Hence, based on the Section 1 of the Article 64 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law, we decided to discharge to the sea approx. ten thousand tons of the accumulated low level radioactive water and the low level radioactive subsurface water stored in the sub drain pits of Units 5 and 6 as soon as we get ready. From 7:03pm, April 4, we started discharge of the low level radioactive wastewater stored in the Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility to the ocean from the south of the water discharge canal. The discharge was finished at 5:40 pm, April 10. Total amount of discharged water is approximately 9,070 tons. Also, from 9:00pm, April 4th, we started discharging the low level radioactive wastewater stored in the sub drain pits of Units 5 and 6 to the ocean from the water discharge canal of Units 5 and 6. At 6:52pm, April 9 we finished discharging water. The amount of water was approximately 1,323 tons.

The total amount of emitted radioactivity is approximately  $1.5 \times 10^{11}$  Bq. We evaluate approximately 0.6 mSv of effective radioactive doses per year per an adult as the impact on the discharge of the low radioactive stored water to the ocean if an adult eats adjacent fish and seaweeds every day. The amount (0.6 mSv of effective radioactive doses per year) is one-fourth of annual radioactive dose (2.4 mSv) to which the general public is exposed from nature and equivalent to that when we evaluated before discharging the water to the ocean.

On April 7, we knocked holes in the external walls of turbine buildings at Units 2 to 4 for the preparation of draining the accumulated water to the Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility.

On April 18, in terms of the transfer of high level radioactive wastewater to the Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility, measures to prevent leakage in the facility building were completed. After reporting the necessity of the transfer, the assessment of safety and principle of the permanent storage of the

wastewater and treatment facility to Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry with the confirmation by Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, the wastewater transfer from the vertical shaft of the turbine building of Unit 2 to the Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility was started from 10:08 am on April 19 (after this, please refer to Unit 2 < Draining water from the underground floor of the turbine building >).

- We conducted nuclide analysis on sub drain water near the turbine buildings and detected Iodine-131, Cesium-134 and Cesium-137 on April 6th and 13th. As a radioactive dose of the sample collected on April 13th increased compared to that of April 6th, we received an oral instruction from Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency to strengthen the monitoring on 7:25 pm on April 14th. In response, we increased the frequency of the sampling of the sub drain water of Units 1 to 6 and a deep well located in the station from once a week to three times a week. We detected Iodine-131, Cesium-134 and Cesium-137 at the sampling survey on April 16, 18, 20, 22, 25, 27, 29, May 2, 4, 6, 9, 11, 13, 16, 18, 20, 22, 23, 25, 27, 30, June 1, 3, 6, 8, 10, 13, 15, 17, 20, 24, 27 and 29. We detected Strontium-89 and Strontium-90 by the sampling survey on May 18. We detected Tritium at the sampling survey on June 13.

#### <Marine Soil>

- We conducted a nuclide analysis on marine soil collected on April 29 (at 2 points, 3km offshore of Fukushima Daiichi and Daini Nuclear Power Stations and Shallow Draft Quay). As a result, Iodine-131, Cesium-134 and Cesium-137 were detected.
- We conducted a nuclide analysis on marine soil collected on June 2 (at 2 points, 3km offshore of Fukushima Daiichi and Daini Nuclear Power Stations). As a result, Cesium-134, Cesium-137, Plutonium-239 and Plutonium-240, Strontium-89 and Strontium-90 were detected.
- As a result of nuclide analyses, cesium-134 and cesium-137 were detected from marine soil collected on June 28 (at 2 different points, approx. 3 km offshore of

Fukushima Daiichi and Daini Nuclear Power Station).

#### <Freshwater supply>

- The first barge of the United States Armed Forces with freshwater to be used to cool down reactors etc. was towed by a ship of Maritime Self-Defense Force and docked at 3:42pm on March 31. At approx. 3:58pm, April 1 we started to replenish filtrate tanks with the freshwater, and finished at 4:25pm. At approx. 10:20am, April 2, we resumed replenishing filtrate tanks with the freshwater, and finished at 4:40pm.
- The second barge of the United States Armed Forces with the freshwater to be used to cool down reactors etc. was towed by the ship of Maritime Self-Defense Force came alongside the pier at approx. 9:10am, April 2.
- We began to transfer fresh water from the second barge to the first barge at 9:52am, April 3 and finished at 11:15am.
- At 11:35am, April 1, a worker fell into the sea while stepping into the ship from the pier during the hose laying work of the barge. Other crew immediately rescued the worker. While he had no injury or contamination, on April 9, we checked him by whole body counter. On April 12, we confirmed that he did not have internal exposure.
- At 10:40 am, May 18, two barge ships of the US military leave for Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station to bring the Mega Float for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. The Mega Float reached Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station at 1:20 pm on the same day.

#### <Accumulated water treatment facility>

- At 3:45 am on June 14, we started cesium adsorption unit of water treatment facility, on a trial basis, using low level contaminated water. The test run ended at 2:00 pm.
- From 1:10 pm to 8:35 pm on June 15, test operation of decontamination instruments in the water treatment facilities was conducted with the low-level contaminated water.

- From 10:40 pm on June 15 to 12:20 am on June 16, cesium adsorption instruments and decontamination instruments of water treatment facilities were operated with low-level contaminated water by trial.
- At 12:20 am on June 16, continuous operation of the whole water treatment facilities with low level contaminated water was initiated
- At about 7:20 pm on June 16, the equipment of the facilities automatically stopped. When we checked the equipment, we found a water leakage from cesium absorption equipment. At this moment, we are under a recovery work for the leakage.
- At 10:00 AM on June 17, we completed a repair on the bad condition occurred in the cesium absorption equipment. At 13:00 PM on the same day, we started an operation of pumping of the equipment.
- From 6:40 pm to 7:00 pm on June 17, a test operation of the whole water treatment facilities started for high radiation-level contained water. At 8:00 pm on June 17, a full operation started.  
At 0:54 am on June 18, we stopped operation of the facility temporarily due to the radiation dose at surface level measured up to the basis of exchange filter of Cesium adsorption Instruments.
- At 7:30 pm on June 19 we conducted a water flow test using highly concentrated contaminated water in Cesium adsorption Instruments of the water treatment facility and finished it at 11:25 pm on the same day.
- At 10:25 am on June 20, we conducted a water flow test using highly concentrated contaminated water in Cesium adsorption Instruments of the water treatment facility and finished it at 2:50 pm on the same day.
- At 12:45 am on June 21, we started a water flow test using highly concentrated contaminated water in Cesium adsorption Instruments of the water treatment facility. At approximately 7:20 am on the same day, a pump transferring filtrated water to coagulation settling instrument tripped, and water treatment facility stopped. At approximately 11:30 am on the same day we restarted the pump that had tripped due to overload of high flow rate on the recirculation side. At

approximately 12:16 pm on June 21 we resumed the operation of the water treatment facility. At approximately 12:30 pm on the same day it reached the rated capacity. At approximately 10:20 am on June 22, we stopped operation of water treatment facility.

- At 0:43 am on June 23, after implementation of changing filters and flushing system etc. of Cesium adsorption Instruments, we resumed the operation of water treatment system.
- At 10:00 am on June 24, we temporarily stopped the operation of water treatment facilities and replaced Cesium Adsorption Tower. After starting the operation of water desalination facilities for the first time at 12:00 pm, we resumed the operation of water treatment facilities at 12:50 pm.
- On June 25, we temporarily stopped the operation of water treatment facilities and implemented flushing system etc. At 3:00 pm, the operation was resumed. At 3:24 pm, the operation was automatically stopped and was resumed. At 4:10 pm, the operation was automatically stopped again. It was confirmed that this was caused by warning of water level decline in oil separators. After an ultrasonic water glass was bypassed, which was one of water glasses (the other is differential pressure type) installed in the water storage tank at the lower side of oil separators, at 4:35 pm the operation was resumed.
- At 10:00 am on June 26, we temporarily stopped the operation of water treatment facilities and implemented flushing system etc. We resumed operation at 6:10 pm on June 26.
- At 4:20 pm on June 27, we started to use treated water for water injection to reactor for Unit 1, 2 and 3. At 5:55 pm, since we confirmed a leakage from the pipe which supplies water from treated water tank to injection pump of reactor, we stopped supplying treated water.
- At 10:06 am on June 28, we stopped operation of water treatment facilities and conducted flushing of systems etc. At 12:24 pm, we resumed the operation.
- We replaced the pipe with a new one and started to operate the transfer pumps of water treatment system at 2:36 pm, June 28. After confirming no leakage and

adjusting water volume, we started to operate circulating injection cooling at 3:55 pm, June 28.

- At around 3:00 pm on June 28, water blot was confirmed at the outlet flange of the processing transfer pump of the accumulated water treatment system, and a saucer was installed at 3:45 pm.
- At around 9:30 am on June 29, water leakage was confirmed at the drain of lower part of the storage tank for water desalinations (concentrated saltwater). We stopped the leakage by installing a closing cap at 10:30 am.
- At 8:10 am on June 29, (two) minute holes were confirmed at the hose for the injection cooling system of the accumulated water treatment system, and operation of the processing transfer pump was stopped at 10:59. After replacing the hose with a new one, we started the processing transfer pump at 1:12 pm. We started to operate circulating injection cooling at 1:33 pm.
- At 10:45 am on June 29, we stopped the accumulated water treatment system due to system flushing etc., and resumed the operation at 2:13 pm. Since an alarm showing water leakage was sounded in the On-site Bunker Building at 2:49 pm, the water treatment system was stopped at 2:53 pm. We are currently confirming the details. Then, after swiping the leaked water and reset the alarm, we restarted the operation at 6:45 pm.
- At 6:54 pm on June 29, we stopped the accumulated water treatment system due to the trouble occurred in the concerted operation of the cesium adsorption instruments and the coagulation settling instruments. As a result of investigation, we confirmed no abnormal issues on the facilities and restarted the operation of the accumulated water treatment system at 9:15 pm.
- At approximately 5:40 on June 29, water leakage was confirmed at the lower part of the closing flange of the storage tank for water desalination (concentrated saltwater). We stopped the leakage and installed a saucer at the lower part of the flange.
- At 9:00 am on June 30, we stopped the water desalination system to treat the concentrated saltwater in the storage tank of the system.

- At 10:46 am on June 30, we stopped the Accumulated Water Treatment Facility, for flushing the system. At 1:35 pm on the same day, we restarted the Facility. At 2:36 pm, we re-stopped the Instruments due to the defect of Coagulation Setting Facility. After adjustment of water level set value of Coagulation Setting Facility treated water tank, at 6:50 pm on the same day, we resumed operation.
- At 7:27 am on July 1, we stopped injecting treated water and started injecting only filtrate water, for the installation of the tank for injection to the reactor (buffer tank) (no change of injection rate).

<Spraying dust inhibitor>

- From 3:00pm on April 1, we started spraying dust inhibitor in order to prevent diffusion of radioactive materials on a trial basis. (The past results are as follows):  
April 1: At the mountain side area of the common spent fuel pool/ Square measure: approx. 500m<sup>2</sup>  
April 5: At the east and south sides of Unit 4 and the mountain side area of the common spent fuel pool / approx. 600m<sup>2</sup> in total  
April 6: At the mountain side area of the common spent fuel pool/ approx. 600m<sup>2</sup>  
April 8: At the mountain side area of the common spent fuel pool/ approx. 680m<sup>2</sup>  
April 10: At the mountain side area of the common spent fuel pool/ approx. 550m<sup>2</sup>  
April 11: At the mountain side area of the common spent fuel pool/ approx. 1,200m<sup>2</sup>  
April 12: At the mountain side area of the common spent fuel pool/ approx. 700m<sup>2</sup>  
April 13: At the mountain side area of the common spent fuel pool/ approx. 400m<sup>2</sup>  
April 14: At the mountain side area of the common spent fuel pool/ approx. 1,600m<sup>2</sup>  
April 15: At the mountain side area of the common spent fuel pool/ approx. 1,900m<sup>2</sup>  
April 16: At the mountain side area of the suppression pool water surge-tank/ approx. 1,800m<sup>2</sup>  
April 17: At around the Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility/ approx. 1,900m<sup>2</sup>  
April 18: At around the Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility/ approx. 1,200m<sup>2</sup>



April 20: At around the Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility/ approx. 1,900m<sup>2</sup>

April 21: At the mountain side area of the common spent fuel pool/ approx. 1,300 m<sup>2</sup> /at the mountainside area of the medium voltage switchgear/ approx.5,100 m<sup>2</sup>.

April 24: At the mountain side of the nuclear reactor building of Unit 5/ approx. 860 m<sup>2</sup>

April 25: At the mountain side of the nuclear reactor building of Unit 5, slope in front of the former Administration Office Building, and gymnasium building / approx. 3,800 m<sup>2</sup>

- Since around 1:30 pm, April 26, we have started spraying the dust inhibitor in full swing (the record is shown below).

April 26: spraying to the area on the coastal side of Units 1 to 4 using an unmanned crawler dump truck, approx 5,000 m<sup>2</sup>.

April 27: spraying to the area on the seaside of Unit 3 using unmanned crawler dump truck, approx 7,500 m<sup>2</sup>

April 28: spraying to the area on the mountain side of the nuclear reactor building of Unit 5 using the conventional method, approx. 4,540 m<sup>2</sup>

April 29: spraying to the area on the east side of the turbine building of Unit 4 using the unmanned crawler dump truck, approx. 7,000 m<sup>2</sup>

April 29: spraying to the area on the mountain side of the nuclear reactor building of Unit 5 using the conventional method, approx. 5,800 m<sup>2</sup>

April 30: spraying to the area on the south side of the turbine building of Unit 4 using the unmanned crawler dump truck, approx. 2,000 m<sup>2</sup>

April 30: spraying to the area on slope in front of the former Administration Office Building using the conventional method, approx. 5,400 m<sup>2</sup>

May 1: spraying to the area on the south side of the reactor building of Unit 4 using the unmanned crawler dump truck, approx. 1,000 m<sup>2</sup>

May 1: spraying to the area on slope in front of the former Administration Office Building using the conventional method (approx. 4,400 m<sup>2</sup>).

May 2: spraying to areas on the south and west side of the reactor building of Unit 4

using the unmanned crawler dump truck (approx. 4,000 m<sup>2</sup>)

May 2: spraying to areas including a slope in front of the former Administration Office Building using the conventional method (approx. 5,500 m<sup>2</sup>)

May 3: spraying to areas on the west side of the reactor building of Unit 3 using the unmanned crawler dump truck (approx. 4,000 m<sup>2</sup>)

May 3: spraying to areas including a slope in front of the former Administration Office Building using the conventional method (approx. 5,300 m<sup>2</sup>)

May 4: spraying to areas on the west side of the Unit 3 reactor building using the unmanned crawler dump truck (approx. 4,000 m<sup>2</sup>)

May 4: spraying to areas including the slope around the former Administration Office Building using the conventional method (approx. 5,200 m<sup>2</sup>)

May 5: spraying to areas on the west side of the Unit 2 reactor building using the unmanned crawler dump truck (approx. 4,000 m<sup>2</sup>)

May 5: spraying to areas including the mountain side of Shallow Draft Quay using the conventional method (approx. 5,350 m<sup>2</sup>)

May 6: spraying to areas on the west side of the Unit 1 reactor building using the unmanned crawler dump truck (approx. 4,000 m<sup>2</sup>)

May 6: spraying to areas including the mountain side of Shallow Draft Quay using the conventional method (approx. 5,200 m<sup>2</sup>)

May 7: spraying to areas including the west side of Shallow Draft Quay using the conventional method (approx. 5,150 m<sup>2</sup>)

May 8: spraying to areas including the west side of Shallow Draft Quay using the conventional method (approx. 5,100 m<sup>2</sup>)

May 9: spraying to areas including the west side of Shallow Draft Quay, using the conventional method

May 9: spraying to areas including nearby the solid waste storage facility, using the conventional method (approx. 5,250m<sup>2</sup>)

May 10, spraying to the east sides of turbine buildings of Units 1 and 2, using an um-manned crawler dump truck (approx. 6,000 m<sup>2</sup>)

May 10, spraying to areas including nearby Solid Waste Storing Facility, using the

conventional method (approx. 5,050 m<sup>2</sup>)

May 11, spraying to areas including nearby Solid Waste Storing Facility, using the conventional method (approx. 5,250 m<sup>2</sup>)

May 12, spraying to areas including nearby Solid Waste Storing Facility, using the conventional method (approx. 5,250 m<sup>2</sup>)

May 13, spraying to the area on the north and east sides of the turbine building of Units 1, using an unmanned crawler dump truck (approx. 6,000 m<sup>2</sup>)

May 13, spraying to areas including nearby Solid Waste Storing Facility, using the conventional method. (approx. 5,250 m<sup>2</sup>)

May 14, spraying to the area on the east sides of the turbine building of Units 2, using an unmanned crawler dump truck (approx. 7,000 m<sup>2</sup>)

May 14, spraying to areas including nearby Solid Waste Storing Facility, using the conventional method.

May 15, spraying dust inhibitor to areas including nearby Solid Waste Storing Facility in a conventional method, approx 7,000 m<sup>2</sup>

May 16, spraying to the area on the east sides of the turbine building of Unit 1, using an unmanned crawler dump truck (approx. 3,000 m<sup>2</sup>)

May 16, spraying dust inhibitor to areas including nearby Solid Waste Storing Facility using the conventional method, approx. 6,520 m<sup>2</sup>

May 17, spraying dust inhibitor to areas including nearby partner companies' yard using the conventional method, approx. 6,520 m<sup>2</sup>

May 18, spraying dust inhibitor to areas including nearby partner companies' yard using the conventional method, approx. 8,750 m<sup>2</sup>

May 19, spraying dust inhibitor to areas including nearby partner companies' yard using the conventional method, approx. 8,750 m<sup>2</sup>

May 20, spraying dust inhibitor to areas including nearby Incombustibles Treatment Facility, approx. 8,250 m<sup>2</sup>

May 23, spraying dust inhibitor to areas including nearby Incombustibles Treatment Facility using the conventional method, approx. 8,750 m<sup>2</sup>

May 24, spraying dust inhibitor to east side of the turbine buildings of Units 2 and 3

using an un-manned crawler dump truck, approx. 6,000 m<sup>2</sup>

May 24, spraying dust inhibitor to areas including nearby Incombustibles Treatment Facility using the conventional method, approx. 8,750 m<sup>2</sup>

May 25, spraying dust inhibitor to areas including nearby Incombustibles Treatment Facility using the conventional method, approx. 8,750 m<sup>2</sup>.

May 26, spraying dust inhibitor to areas including the north side of Unit 1's reactor building using unmanned crawler dump, approx. 6,000 m<sup>2</sup>.

May 26, spraying dust inhibitor to areas including areas surrounding Incombustibles Treatment Facility using the conventional method approx. 7,875 m<sup>2</sup>.

May 27, spraying dust inhibitor to the roof and the wall of Unit 1's turbine building using a bending spray tower vehicle. , approx. 6,600 m<sup>2</sup>.

May 27, spraying dust inhibitor to areas including areas surrounding Incombustibles Treatment Facility using the conventional method. approx. 8,750 m<sup>2</sup>.

May 28, spraying dust inhibitor to areas including areas surrounding Solid Waste Storing Facility using the conventional method, approx 4.375m<sup>2</sup>.

May 29, spraying dust inhibitor to areas including areas surrounding Main Gate using the conventional method, approx 8,750m<sup>2</sup>.

May 31, spraying dust inhibitor to areas including areas surrounding Main Gate using the conventional method, approx. 8,750 m<sup>2</sup>.

June 1, spraying dust inhibitor to the roof and exterior wall of reactor building at Unit 2 whose area is approximately 2,200 m<sup>2</sup> using a bending spray tower vehicle.

June 1, spraying dust inhibitor to areas of approximately 8,750 m<sup>2</sup> including surrounding Main Gate ones using the conventional method.

June 2, spraying dust inhibitor to the roof and exterior wall of the reactor building of Unit 2 using a bending spray tower vehicle (approx. 7,200 m<sup>2</sup>)

June 2, spraying dust inhibitor to areas including near the Main Gate, using the conventional method (approx. 8,525 m<sup>2</sup>).

June 3, spraying dust inhibitor to the roof and exterior wall of the reactor building of Unit 3 using a bending spray tower vehicle (approximately 4,800 m<sup>2</sup>).

June 3, spraying dust inhibitor to areas including observation point using the conventional method (approx. 8,750 m<sup>2</sup>).

June 4, spraying dust inhibitor to the roof and exterior wall of the reactor building of Unit 4 using a bending spray tower vehicle (approximately 7,200 m<sup>2</sup>).

June 4, spraying dust inhibitor to areas including observation point using the conventional method (approx. 10,500 m<sup>2</sup>).

June 5, spraying dust inhibitor to areas including observation point using the conventional method (approx. 8,750 m<sup>2</sup>).

June 6, spraying dust inhibitor to areas including observation point using the conventional method (approx. 8,750 m<sup>2</sup>).

June 7, spraying dust inhibitor to areas including observation point using the conventional method (approx. 8,750 m<sup>2</sup>).

June 8, using a concrete pumping vehicle, we have implemented spraying dust inhibitor to the roof and the wall of Unit 1's turbine building (approx. 1,000 m<sup>2</sup>).

June 8, dust inhibitor was sprayed at observation point area using the conventional method. (approx. 8,750 m<sup>2</sup>).

June 9, dust inhibitor was sprayed to the roof and the wall of Unit 1 and 3 turbine buildings using concrete pumping vehicles. (approx. 6,400 m<sup>2</sup>) Dust inhibitor was also sprayed near the main gate by ordinary method. (approx. 8,750 m<sup>2</sup>)

June 10, dust inhibitor was sprayed to the roof and the wall of Unit 1 and 2 turbine buildings and the wall of Unit 2 reactor building. using concrete pumping vehicles. (approx. 3,000m<sup>2</sup>) Dust inhibitor was also sprayed near the welfare building by ordinary method. (approx. 8,750 m<sup>2</sup>)

June 11, dust inhibitor was sprayed to the area including near the gym. (approx. 4,735m<sup>2</sup>)

June 13, dust inhibitor was sprayed to the area surrounding Main Gate. (approx. 8,750m<sup>2</sup>)

June 14, dust inhibitor was sprayed to areas around the UHV Switching Station for

Units 5 & 6 etc. by the conventional method (approx. 8,750m<sup>2</sup>)

June 15, dust inhibitor was sprayed to areas around the UHV Switching Station for Units 5 & 6 etc. (approx. 7,000m<sup>2</sup>)

June 16, dust inhibitor was sprayed at the road around former administrating office building by the conventional method (approx. 6,600m<sup>2</sup>).

June 17, dust inhibitor was sprayed in the ground by the conventional method (approx. 7,000m<sup>2</sup>).

June 18, dust inhibitor was sprayed to the roof and the wall of Unit 4 turbine buildings. using concrete pumping vehicles. (approx. 3,200m<sup>2</sup>)

June 18, dust inhibitor was sprayed around the main gate by the conventional method. (approx. 7,000m<sup>2</sup>)

June 19, dust inhibitor was sprayed at the west side area of the reactor building of Unit 2 in conventional method. (approx. 6,810 m<sup>2</sup>)

June 20, dust inhibitor was sprayed to yards around Unit 5 by a crawler dump truck. materials yards etc. in a conventional method. (approx. 5,800 m<sup>2</sup>)

June 20, dust inhibitor was sprayed at the materials yards, etc in conventional method. (approx. 5,250 m<sup>2</sup>)

June 21, dust inhibitor was sprayed to yards approx.5,900m<sup>2</sup> around Unit 5 by a crawler dump truck.

June 21, dust inhibitor was sprayed to materials yards etc. approx.5,250m<sup>2</sup> in a conventional method.

June 22, dust inhibitor was sprayed on the east side of the turbine building of Unit 6 approx.8,300 m<sup>2</sup>with a crawler dump truck.

June 22, dust inhibitor was sprayed to at the south of protection bank approx.5,250m<sup>2</sup> in a conventional method.

June 23, dust inhibitor was sprayed at the north of UHV switching station of Unit 5 and 6 in conventional method approx 5,160m<sup>2</sup> by a conventional method.

June 24, dust inhibitor was sprayed on the north side of the turbine building of Unit 6 with a crawler dump truck. (approx. 5,400m<sup>2</sup>)

June 24, dust inhibitor was sprayed to areas around Main Anti-Earthquake Building in

conventional method. (approx. 4,659 m<sup>2</sup>)

June 25, dust inhibitor was sprayed on the yard of the Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility with a crawler dump truck. (approx. 2,400m<sup>2</sup>)

June 26, dust inhibitor was sprayed on the north side of the turbine building of Unit 6 in conventional method. (approx. 4,490m<sup>2</sup>)

June 27, dust inhibitor was sprayed on the west side of the reactor building of Unit 5 and 6 with a crawler dump truck. (approx. 5,300m<sup>2</sup>)

June 28, dust inhibitor was sprayed on around filtrate water tank area (approx. 541 m<sup>2</sup>)

#### <Common spent fuel pool>

- On March 18, regarding the spent fuel in the common spent fuel pool\*, we have confirmed that the water level of the pool was secured. At around 10:37am March 21, water spraying to common spent fuel pool has started and finished at approx. 3:30pm. At around 6:05pm, fuel pool cooling pump was activated to cool the pool.

\*common spent fuel pool: a spent fuel pool for common use set in a separate building in a plant site in order to preserve spent fuel which are transferred from the spent fuel pool in each Unit building.

- At 2:34 pm, April 17, the occurrence of a short circuit caused by the lack of repair of the end of the unused cable which is connected parallel to the power of spent fuel common pool caused the circuit breaker of the power side to open resulting in suspended power supply to the spent fuel common pool. However, at 5:30 pm, April 17, the power of the spent fuel common pool was restored after the removal and inspection of the cable.

#### <Analysis of water in the common spent fuel pool>

- On May 13, in order to confirm the status of the common spent fuel pool, we sampled approx 1,000 ml of water. On May 14, as a result of the nuclide analysis of the sampled water, we detected Cesium 134 and Cesium 137. We are planning to conduct the detailed evaluation from now on.

#### <Dry cask building>

- On March 17, we patrolled buildings for dry casks\* and found no signs of abnormal situation for the casks by visual observation. A detailed inspection will be conducted hereafter.

\*dry cask: a measure to store spent fuel in a dry storage casks in storages. Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station started to utilize the measure from August 1995.

#### <Injured / ill health> (Latest)

- Approx. 11:10am on April 10, at the yard of Unit 2, a worker who wore an anorak and a full face mask said that he felt sick while he was laying a discharging hose. A medical staff accompanied him from Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station to J-Village conducting a course of injections in the car. After that, at 2:27pm, he was sent to Sougou Iwaki Kyoritsu Hospital by an ambulance. No radioactive material attached to his body.

- No injured workers inside of the building were confirmed due to the earthquake which occurred at approximately 5:16pm, April 11.

- On April 27, with regards to the effective radiation doze of 3 months period starting from January 1st of this year for a female employee, who have been in charge for the work after the Tohoku-Chihou Taiheiyou-oki Earthquake, was 17.55 mSv which is in excess of statutory limit of 5mSv/3months for female. After the medical examination by a doctor it was confirmed that it does not have effect to the health. On May 1, we have confirmed that the effective exposure dose from January 1st, 2011 to March (the 4th quarter of the 2010 fiscal year) of another female employee who has also been in the restoration work after the Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake is 7.49 mSv, which is in excess of statutory dose limits (5 mSv / 3 months). The employee took medical examination on May 2, and the result confirmed that there is no effect on the employee's health.

- At around 11:00 am on May 5, a worker fell from the stepladder and got injured

when assembling a temporary rest station at the parking area outside the west gate of the power station. The worker was taken to the Fukushima Rosai Hospital by ambulance. There was no contamination to the body.

- At about 6:50 AM on May 14, a worker of a sub-contractor became a bad health during a carrying work for drainage treatment system in the Centralized Environment Facility. He was carried to a doctor's room of the power station at 7:03 AM and had medical treatment. Since he had lost his consciousness and stopped self breathing, at 7:35 AM he was carried to a doctor in the J Village and the doctor examined his condition. After that, at 8:35 AM, he was carried to Sogo Iwaki Kyoritsu Hospital. Radioactive substances were not attached to the worker. At 2:10 pm, on May 15, we received notification that at 9:33 am, on May 14<sup>th</sup>, the worker was confirmed dead by the doctor.
- At approximately 10:20 am on May 23, a partner company's worker who was unloading a tank for the treatment water at the carry-in gate for large stuff, the 1st floor of On-site Bunker Building, had his left hand injured. After having diagnoses at the medical room of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and at J village, he was transferred to Iwaki Kyouritsu Hospital by an ambulance. No contamination to his body was confirmed.
- At approximately 1:30 pm on May 31, one of the partner companies' workers who were installing cables at Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility got his right hand forefinger injured. After the intravenous drip at the medical room of the station, he was transferred to J Village at 2:26 pm. Then at 3:35 pm he was transferred from J Village to Fukushima accident Hospital. There was no contamination to his body.
- At 9:00 am on June 4, one worker from a partner company who was under mission to collect accumulated water at the Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility, Process Main Building 1<sup>st</sup> Floor, said he felt sick, and therefore was transferred to Iwaki-Kyoritsu Hospital by a helicopter emergency medical service. The worker was diagnosed as "transient unconscious attack and dehydration".

- Approximately 10 am on June 5, a partner company's worker (equipped with overalls, Tyvek, and full-face mask) reported that he felt sick during the power-cable installation task near the Wild bird forest in the power plant's premise. After physical examination at the medical treatment room of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, he was taken to J-VILLAGE by ambulance at approximately 10:37 am. At 11:20 am, a helicopter emergency medical service was requested by J-VILLAGE. After transported to Hirono Central Gymnasium by ambulance, the worker was transported to Iwaki Kyouritsu Hospital by the helicopter service. According to the physical examination, it was explained that he was suspected to suffer from "dehydration," and needs treatment in the hospital about a week. Besides him, around 10:15 am on the same day, another partner company's worker (in the same equipment as the one of the above worker) reported that he felt sick during the similar work. After physical examination at the medical treatment room of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, he was transported to J-VILLAGE by ambulance at approximately 12:07 pm because of his serious condition. At 12:40 pm, he was transported to Fukushima accident Hospital from J-VILLAGE by ambulance. After the physical examination, he was diagnosed to suffer from dehydration, and to be requested to keep quiet in bed at home for three days.
- At 7:10 pm, June 6, at Incineration Workshop Building of Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility, a worker of cooperating company has slipped down and hit left breast. After examination and treatment at medical room of power station, at around 8:10 pm he was transferred to J-Village. At 9:22 pm, he was transferred to Iwaki Kyoritsu Hospital by ambulance. No pollution to the body was found. He was diagnosed as "injury to the spleen and a rib fracture."
- At approximately 1:30 pm on June 24, we transferred a partner company's worker, who reported illness during the installation work of temporary tank, to J village by a corporate car. At 3:14 pm, the worker was transferred to Iwaki Kyouritsu Hospital by an ambulance. No body contamination was confirmed. The worker was diagnosed as "heatstroke".

<Others>

- Video recording of Units 1 to 4 reactor buildings and its surrounding area from the air by using an unmanned helicopter:  
From 3:59pm to 4:28pm on April 10 / From 10:17am to 12:25pm on April 14  
From 8:02am to 9:55am on April 15 / From 11:43am to 12:50pm on April 21
- At approximately 7:00 am on June 24, an unmanned helicopter collecting dust from the open part of the reactor building of Unit 2 made an emergency landing on the top of the reactor building of Unit 2. Thereafter, we confirmed no impact made to the reactor building of Unit 2 through the monitoring camera equipped onto the tip of a concrete pumping vehicle.
- April 5 approx. 3:00 pm, "Mega Float" left from Shimizu port and arrived at Yokohama port. Manufacturer of "Mega Float" finished inspection and remodeling work. At 5:20am on May 15, "Mega Float" left from Yokohama port to Onahama port. At around 8:00 am on May 17, it arrived at Onahama port. At 6:20 pm on May 20, it left for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. At 9:35 am on May 21, it arrived at the shallow draft quay in Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.
- At 11:05 am on June 15, it was confirmed that a worker from a partner company in charge of crane assembling work for the preparing the installation of the cover in Unit 1 reactor building at shallow draft quay was smoking with his full mask off. While the density of radioactive materials in the air at the working place was below the detectable level both for particulate materials and iodine, whole body counter will be implemented later. The evaluation exposure dose is; external exposure---0.13mSv and internal exposure---0.24mSv.
- At around 11:45 am on June 29, a worker of a partner company found himself wearing a overall mask without a charcoal filter and returned to the Main Anti-Earthquake Building immediately after leaving the Building for inspection of the water treatment system. The result of an examination suggests that the level of internal radioactivity was extremely low enough not to affect his body.
- At 5:00 pm on June 30, the installation of temporary storm surge barrier was

completed.

Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station

Units 1 to 4: Shutdown due to the earthquake

- The national government has instructed evacuation for those local residents within 10km radius of the periphery.
- In order to achieve cold shutdown, reactor cooling function was restored and cooling of reactors was conducted. As a result, all reactors achieved cold shutdown; Unit 1 at 5:00pm, March 14, Unit 2 at 6:00pm, March 14, Unit 3 at 12:15pm, March 12, and Unit 4 at 7:15am, March 15.
- At 2:30pm on March 30, the power source of the residual heat removal system (B) to cool the reactor of Unit 1 was secured from an emergency power source in addition to an offsite power. This means that all the units secure backup power sources (emergency power sources) for the residual heat removal system (B).
- As radiation dose measured at site boundary exceeded the threshold amount, it was determined on March 14 and 15 that a specific incident stipulated in article 10, clause 1(increase of radiations dose at site boundary) occurred. However, the measured amount has been below the threshold amount of 5 $\mu$ Sv/h afterwards. Site will be under continuous surveillance.
- At approximately 10:01 am on May 27, a fire broke out at the distribution panel for lighting at power supply room for High Pressure Core Spray System on the 1st basement floor of Unit 1's reactor building annex. At 10:04 am on the same day, workers of a partner company extinguished the fire, and TEPCO's employee confirmed the fire had been extinguished. We report the incident to the fire station at 10:08 am on the same day. At 11:19 am on the same day, the fire station staff confirmed at the site that the fire had been extinguished. This incident has been judged as a small fire of building.
- At around 6:10 pm on June 8, during the work of draining water stored in the tank, for the purpose of inspection of emergency underground tanks of High-voltage Start-up Transformer, a TEPCO employee found and confirmed oil leakage to the

sea surface around the water discharge canal of Unit 3 and 4, Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station. Draining the stored water was suspended and oil adsorption mattresses were utilized to prevent the spread of oil. At 9:50 pm on June 8, oil fence barriers were installed and extremely thin oil layer inside the oil fence was observed. Maximum amount of leaked oil was estimated to be 0.5 m<sup>3</sup>. The cause of leakage is under investigation. Discharged water is all rain water, and discharge was done through a duct, thus there is no discharge of radioactive materials to the sea.

- At 2:45 pm on June 23, at check point of service building of Unit 1 and Unit 2, a security agent, who attended materials taking out, caught his clothing to the fire extinguisher on the wall and dropped to injure right foot little finger. The security agent was transferred to the J-village and arrived at 3:58 pm. After treatment of doctor, transferred at 4:30 pm to Sogo Iwaki Kyoritsu Hospital by ambulance. After the treatment, he went home. No contamination was found due to the body survey. As a result of another diagnosis on June 24, he has been diagnosed as laceration of the fifth finger on right foot, fracture of distal phalanx and needs about 4 weeks for outpatient treatment.

### **[Unit 1]**

- As it was confirmed that the temperature of the Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System\* was increasing, at 3:20pm, March 15, we stopped the Residual Heat Removal System (B) for the inspection. Subsequently, failure was detected in the power supply facility associated with the pumps of the Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System. At 4:25pm, March 15, after replacing the power facility, the pumps and the Residual Heat Removal System (B) have been reactivated.

### **[Unit 3]**

- At 2:05pm on June 6, the Clean Up Water System\* of Unit 3 has been restored.  
\*Clean Up Water System. The system removes impurities in the reactor water and maintains the water quality. The system is also used to control reactor water level by discharging redundant water from the reactor during regular inspection or

reactor shutdown.

### **[Unit 4]**

- As it was confirmed that the pressure at the outlet of the pumps of the Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System\* was decreased, at 8:05pm, March 15, we stopped the Residual Heat Removal System (B) for the inspection. Subsequently, failure was detected in the power supply facility associated with the pumps of the Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System. At 9:25pm, March 15, after replacing the relevant facility, the pumps and the Residual Heat Removal System (B) have been reactivated.  
\*emergency water system in which cooling water (pure water) circulates which exchanged the heat with sea water in order to cool down bearing pumps and/or heat exchangers etc.
- At 10:00am on June 4th, the Clean Up Water System\* of Unit 3 has been restored.
- At 4:00 pm on June 7, air leak was found at the weld zone of unit 4's main emission duct by TEPCO employee. (10cm x 3cm 2 places ). Radioactive materials in the air were below measurable limits. No outlier at main emission monitor and monitoring post. The repair work will be implemented soon.

Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station

**Units 1, 5, 6, and 7: Normal operation (Units 2 to 4: Outage due to regular inspections)**