

Investigation on a Worker (Bus Driver) Using Other Worker's ID

1. Outline

Regarding the "usage of other person's ID" by a bus driver, it was found that the bus driver used his absent co-worker's ID on July 24, August 14, 16 and 29, 2012 to borrow an APD.

2. Investigation results

The results of investigation on the bus company where this issue was found are as follows.

[Usage of other person's ID]

- As a result of checking the work schedule, our APD data and the APD records during the period of July 1 to September 6, the radiation data of the bus driver (the same person who used other person's ID on July 24) on July 24, August 14, 16 and 29 was not found though he worked on these days and had the APD records.
- After work, the driver got an APD record with the radiation dose printed on it when returning an APD and submitted it to his company after modifying it (as other person's ID number was on his record, he cut it out and put his ID number instead).
- It was confirmed that the driver had not used other worker's ID before July 24 as a result of comparing his work schedule with our radiation dose data.

[The driver's actual work conditions]

- The driver has been a substitute bus driver since July and drove between Fukushima Daiichi NPS and J-Village when his company requested him to substitute (Normally the driver was in charge of a different route where the worker ID of Fukushima Daiichi NPS was not required).
- Since July, the driver substituted 9 times and drove between Fukushima Daiichi NPS and J-Village. In 4 out of the 9 times he substituted (July 24, August 14, 16 and 29), he left his ID at home and used other driver's ID which was stored in the bus to borrow an APD.

[Interview with the driver]

- The driver did not recognize the importance of accurately recording the radiation dose and its impact on health. He did not think it would be a problem to borrow an APD with other person's ID as long as the data is modified to his.

- When he left his ID at home, he used other person's ID stored in the bus to borrow an APD in order to be on schedule (so that his bus won't be delayed).

[Management of worker's ID at the bus company]

- There were not particular rules of worker's ID management at the company.
- In this case, other person's ID was left in the bus the driver drove as a substitute.
- The driver kept his ID at home.

3. Our identification system applied when borrowing APD

Workers borrow an APD either at the Main Anti-earthquake Building and the J-Village. The identification by comparing the face of an individual and the photo attached on the ID was not sufficient.

4. Causes

- The driver had a false recognition that there was no problem (in terms of radiation dose control) with using other person's APD to borrow an APD.
- As no rules are set for ID management, there were bus drivers who kept their ID in the bus.
- The issue was not detected because of the insufficient identification (comparing the face of an individual and the photo attached on the ID) at the time of lending APD.

5. Recurrence prevention measures

[Bus company]

A locker will be installed in the office to store worker's ID (one box per each worker) to prevent workers from forgetting to bring their ID to work. The ID will be checked at the roll call before work.

[TEPCO]

- Identification by comparing the face of an individual and the photo on the ID will be required when lending APD. This rule has become effective at the J-Village on September 6 and at the Main Anti-earthquake Building at Fukushima Daiichi NPS on September 7.
- Report this issue at the safety promotion meeting, radiation control meeting, etc. held at Fukushima Daiichi NPS.
- The bus driver involved in this matter has been deregistered as an "occupationally exposed person" on September 6.

End