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Issues Related to Nuclear Material Protection at the Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power
Station

May 19, 2021

Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc.

## <u>Issue 1: Insufficiently managed boundary hallway door (discovered by TEPCO</u> employee)

- On March 19, 2021, TEPCO operator shift personnel discovered that the hallway door on the boundary between the Unit 4 surrounding protected zone\*1 and protected zone\*2 was not being managed properly from the perspective of nuclear material protection. Furthermore, on the next day, a similar situation was found with a hallway door at Unit 1.
- The aforementioned issue was immediately reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Agency and substitute measures were quickly implemented to prevent people from using the aforementioned hallway door. After this, corrective action was taken in the form of sealing the hallway door. The Nuclear Regulatory Agency confirmed on April 19 that the aforementioned corrective action is adequate.
- The aforementioned hallway door is normally rarely used, and the doors in the surrounding protected zone to which the aforementioned hallway door leads are kept locked for radiation control reasons. TEPCO has also confirmed that there are no signs that the locks have been tampered with.

# ■ <u>Issue 2: Inadequate procedures for reentry to protected zone from surrounding protected zone (Indicated by Nuclear Regulatory Agency)</u>

- Ouring a nuclear regulatory inspection performed on March 23, 2021 in response to Issue 1, the Nuclear Regulatory Agency indicated to TEPCO that the implementation of set procedures (such as going through metal detectors, etc.) employed after temporarily entering the surrounding protected zone and reentering the protected zone through managed protective doors at the boundary of the surrounding protected zone and protected zone, which are in a different location from the entry/exit gate, are inadequate. (Similar conditions were found at other units).
- TEPCO immediately took the corrective action of sealing the entries/exits so that

the protected zone cannot be entered/exited from the aforementioned protective doors, and on March 24 the Nuclear Regulatory Agency confirmed that the aforementioned corrective action is adequate.

O Furthermore, the hallway doors in the surrounding protected zone that lead to the aforementioned door are normally kept lock for radiation control reasons, and TEPCO has confirmed that there are no signs that the locks have been tampered with.

### ■ Issue 3: Loss of invalid ID card

- On February 16, 2021, a TEPCO employee reported that s/he had lost an ID card used to enter protected zones (excluding the main control rooms). This was reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Agency the following day. The aforementioned ID card had already been rendered invalid in April 2016.
- The aforementioned ID card was subsequently found by the aforementioned employee on February 23, 2021.
- O During a nuclear regulatory inspection performed thereafter, it was pointed out that there had been a failure to collect unneeded ID cards previously used at the Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station.
- O In response to the indication by the Nuclear Regulatory Agency all unneeded ID cards were rendered invalid and collected by TEPCO.

#### \*1: Surrounding protected zone

Zones that surround protected zones in order to ensure that specific nuclear fuel material in protected zones\*2 is protected.

#### \*2: Protected zone

Zone for protecting specific nuclear fuel material.